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In Samantar v Yousuf,1 the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) does not apply to
lawsuits brought against foreign government ofﬁcials for alleged
human rights abuses.2 The Court did not necessarily clear the way
for future human rights litigation against such ofﬁcials, however,
cautioning that such suits “may still be barred by foreign sovereign
immunity under the common law.”3 At the same time, the Court
provided only minimal guidance as to the content and scope of
common law immunity. Especially striking was the Court’s omission
of any mention of the immunity of foreign ofﬁcials under customary
international law (CIL), the body of international law that “results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
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from a sense of legal obligation.”4 Not only were international law
issues extensively briefed by the parties and amici, but the question
of whether foreign ofﬁcials are immune from suits alleging human
rights violations had recently been extensively litigated in other
national courts and international tribunals, and these decisions were
brought to the Court’s attention.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s inattention to the international law backdrop in Samantar, CIL immunity principles are
likely to be relevant to the development of the common law of
foreign ofﬁcial immunity. The Court has taken account of CIL in
related contexts and has endorsed a canon of statutory construction
designed to avoid unintended breaches of CIL. Both Congress and
the Executive Branch have also indicated that they consider CIL
to be relevant to immunity, and the judiciary is usually attentive to
the views and actions of the political branches when developing
common law relating to foreign affairs.
There is also a rich and growing body of CIL materials that
courts can draw upon. As we will explain, these materials show that
CIL traditionally extended immunity to individual ofﬁcials in proceedings in foreign courts for actions taken on behalf of their state.
In the criminal context, this immunity has eroded over the past
decade, with national courts outside of the United States increasingly exercising criminal jurisdiction over former ofﬁcials, including
heads of state, charged with human rights violations. No comparable
erosion has yet occurred, however, in the civil context. Although a
few decisions have embraced a human rights exception to immunity,
the courts of several other countries have expressly declined to adopt
such an exception. At the same time, the relationship between immunity and human rights law is still very much in ﬂux, and international tribunals currently are considering cases that concern this
relationship.
The unsettled state of CIL raises important issues concerning
the role and competence of U.S. courts as they develop the common
law of foreign ofﬁcial immunity. On the one hand, they have an
opportunity to participate in a global judicial dialogue over the
proper balance between immunity and accountability and to shape
international law’s future trajectory. On the other hand, the uncertain state of the law may indicate that U.S. courts should exercise
4

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (1987).
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caution before advancing an interpretation of CIL that may offend
foreign governments or create foreign relations difﬁculties for the
Executive Branch. Ultimately, as we will discuss, a variety of institutional and policy considerations are likely to shape the relevance
of CIL to the post-Samantar common law of immunity.
The development of this body of common law immunity also
implicates long-standing debates over the incorporation of CIL into
federal common law. In the past, scholars who argued for such
incorporation did so primarily to promote accountability for past
human rights abuses and to expand the opportunities for litigating
human rights claims in U.S. courts. Other scholars, however, challenged the federal adjudication of customary human rights norms
on the basis of domestic considerations such as separation of powers.
There may be a reversal of positions in the wake of Samantar.
Commentators who previously opposed adjudication of CIL in U.S.
courts may be favorably disposed to incorporating international
immunity rules into the common law—a doctrinal move that could
signiﬁcantly narrow the scope of international human rights litigation. Conversely, commentators who previously supported application of CIL by U.S. courts may now oppose the incorporation
of CIL in this context, or argue that it is too indeterminate, and
urge courts to apply instead the immunity principles of domestic
civil rights law—principles that may facilitate holding foreign government ofﬁcials accountable for human rights abuses.
This article self-consciously avoids taking a position on these
theoretical debates or on the ultimate question of the proper scope
of foreign ofﬁcial immunity. Instead, we seek to make three contributions. First, we set forth a case for CIL’s relevance to the postSamantar common law of immunity that is not dependent on a
single theoretical perspective regarding the domestic status of CIL.
Second, we present what we believe is a relatively dispassionate
assessment of the evolving CIL landscape, an assessment that is
aided by the fact that we ourselves have somewhat differing perspectives about the proper role of international law in general and
in human rights litigation in U.S. courts in particular. Third, by
emphasizing institutional considerations, we are able to isolate particular variables—such as the views of the Executive Branch and
the policies embodied in domestic statutes—that will shape how
CIL affects the common law of immunity after Samantar.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I brieﬂy discusses the history

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719707
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of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States. It then reviews
the facts, procedural history, and decision in Samantar, highlighting
the international law backdrop of the case. Part II reviews the CIL
of foreign ofﬁcial immunity and recent national and international
court rulings. Part III returns to the United States. It explains how
the relevance of CIL immunity rules will depend not only on international law’s relationship to federal common law, but also on
other considerations such as the degree to which U.S. courts should
be active players in the development of CIL, the authority of the
Executive Branch to affect ongoing litigation, and the policies reﬂected in existing statutes.
I. Samantar and the International Law Road Not Taken
In this part, we begin by describing the historical background
and text of the FSIA, as well as the lower court precedent that had
developed prior to Samantar concerning suits against foreign ofﬁcials. We then describe the facts and proceedings in Samantar.
Finally, we consider the Court’s decision and explain why, regardless
of whether the Court reached the right conclusion, it is noteworthy
that its analysis takes no direct account of international law.
a. foreign sovereign immunity
The application of foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. courts
is usually traced to the Supreme Court’s early nineteenth-century
decision in Schooner Exchange v McFaddon.5 In that case, two individuals brought a “libel” action against a French naval vessel
that had docked in Philadelphia, claiming that they were the original owners of the vessel and that it had been seized from them
unlawfully. In upholding a dismissal of the action, the Court, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, began by noting that “[t]he
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute” and “is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself.”6 As a result, said the Court, “[a]ll exceptions
. . . to the full and complete power of a nation within its own
5
11 US (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see also Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 US 677, 688
(2004) (“Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Schooner Exchange . . . is generally viewed as
the source of our foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence.”).
6
Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) at 136.
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territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.”7
The Court found, however, based on “common usage” and “common opinion,” that there was “a principle of public law, that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for
their reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent
of that power from its jurisdiction.”8 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court analogized to the well-settled immunity under CIL for
both heads of state and foreign ministers.9 The Court also appears
to have been inﬂuenced by the fact that the Executive Branch had
intervened in the case to support a grant of immunity.10
Although Schooner Exchange speciﬁcally addressed only the immunity of foreign warships, over time U.S. courts applied a doctrine of absolute immunity in suits brought against foreign states
and their instrumentalities, a doctrine that was viewed as stemming
from considerations of both international law and international
comity.11 The courts also developed an “act of state” doctrine that
barred U.S. courts from judging the validity of the acts of foreign
governments taken within their own territory.12 As originally developed, the act of state doctrine was intertwined with considerations of immunity.13 Eventually, however, it evolved into a distinct
doctrine that was grounded in considerations of separation of powers.14
7

Id.

8

Id at 136, 145– 46.

9

See id at 137–38.

10

See Schooner Exchange, 11 US (7 Cranch) at 147 (“There seems to be a necessity for
admitting that the fact [of immunity] might be disclosed to the Court by the suggestion
of the Attorney for the United States.”).
11
See Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View 9–20 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, pt IV, ch 5, Introductory Note at 390–91 (cited in note 4). See also, for example, Wulfsohn v Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic, 138 NE 24, 26 (NY Ct App 1923) (“[Courts] may not bring a
foreign sovereign before our bar, not because of comity, but because he has not submitted
himself to our laws. Without his consent he is not subject to them.”); Hassard v United
States of Mexico, 29 Misc 511, 512 (NY Sup Ct 1899) (“It is an axiom of international law,
of long-established and general recognition, that a sovereign State cannot be sued in its
own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission.”), aff ’d, 46 AD 623 (1899).
12
See, for example, Underhill v Hernandez, 168 US 250, 252 (1897).
13
See id (“The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts
done within their own States, in the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil
ofﬁcers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of governments
ruling by paramount force as matter of fact.”).
14
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino, 376 US 398, 438 (1964) (“The act of state
doctrine . . . although it shares with the immunity doctrine a respect for sovereign states,
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From the earliest days of the nation, the Executive Branch expressed the view that the immunity of a foreign state also extended
to ofﬁcials acting on its behalf, at least when the conduct in question occurred outside the United States.15 The Supreme Court
endorsed this proposition in Underhill v Hernandez.16 In that case,
a U.S. citizen sued a Venezuelan military commander, whose revolutionary government had been recognized by the United States,
for unlawful assault and detention in Venezuela. The decision is
most famous for its articulation of the act of state doctrine, pursuant to which “the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.”17 The Supreme Court also recognized, however, that
individual ofﬁcials have “immunity . . . from suits brought in
foreign tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the
exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil ofﬁcers or as
military commanders.”18 Similarly, the Second Circuit in Underhill
had concluded that a foreign state’s immunity extends to suits
against the state’s ofﬁcials for actions carried out on behalf of the
state. “[B]ecause the acts of the ofﬁcial representatives of the state
are those of the state itself, when exercised within the scope of
their delegated powers,” the Second Circuit explained, “courts and
publicists have recognized the immunity of public agents from
suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own
states in the exercise of the sovereignty thereof.”19
concerns the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law.”);
see also Altmann, 541 US at 700 (“Unlike a claim of sovereign immunity, which merely
raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign states with a
substantive defense on the merits.”).
15
See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Domestic
Ofﬁcer Suits, 13 Green Bag 2d 137, 141– 44 (2010); see also Brief for the United States
of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Afﬁrmance, Matar v Dichter, No 07-2579-cv,
*7 (2d Cir, ﬁled Dec 19, 2007) (“United States Matar Brief ”) (available on Westlaw at
2007 WL 6931924) (“The immunity of a foreign sovereign was, early on, generally understood to encompass not only the state, heads of state, and diplomatic ofﬁcials, but also
other ofﬁcials insofar as they acted on the state’s behalf.”); Statement of Interest of the
United States of America, Yousuf v Samantar, at 4, No 1:04 CV 1360 (LMB) (ED Va, Feb
14, 2011) (“The immunity of a foreign state was, early on, generally understood to extend
not only to the state, heads of state, and diplomatic ofﬁcials, but also to other ofﬁcials
acting in an ofﬁcial capacity.”).
16
17

168 US 250, 252 (1897).
Id.

18
Id. See also Sabbatino, 376 US at 430 (noting that “sovereign immunity provided an
independent ground” in Underhill ).
19

Underhill v Hernandez, 65 F 577, 579 (2d Cir 1895). See also John Bassett Moore, 2
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Starting in the late 1930s, U.S. courts began to give absolute
deference to suggestions from the State Department about
whether to grant immunity in particular cases.20 If the department
did not take a position on immunity, courts attempted to decide
the issue “in conformity to the principles accepted by the department.”21 In 1952, the department issued the Tate Letter, which
announced an important shift in the U.S. approach to sovereign
immunity.22 Addressed from the State Department’s Acting Legal
Adviser to the Acting Attorney General, the Tate Letter asserted
that, consistent with the practice of a number of other countries,
the department now supported only a “restrictive” approach to
immunity, pursuant to which “the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts ( jure imperii)
of a state, but not with respect to private acts ( jure gestionis).”23
Among other things, the letter explained that “the widespread and
increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in
commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will enable
persons doing business with them to have their rights determined
in the courts.”24 The letter concluded with this observation: “It is
realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the
courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea
of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do
so.”25
Despite the letter’s modesty about its potential impact on judicial decision making, courts followed the department’s new reA Digest of International Law § 179 (1906) (collecting authorities from the late 1700s
through Underhill).
20
See Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, SA v The Navemar, 303 US 68, 74
(1938); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 US 578, 588–89 (1943). Consider also Berizzi Bros.
Co. v The Pesaro, 271 US 562, 574 (1926) (granting immunity even though the State
Department had argued in the lower court that immunity should not be granted). For
discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human
Rights Litigation, 97 Mich L Rev 2129, 2161–65 (1999); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va L Rev 1, 27–28, 134 – 45
(1999).
21
Republic of Mexico v Hoffman, 324 US 30, 35 (1945).
22
See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to Acting
U.S. Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dept State Bull
984 (1952).
23
24
25

Id at 984.
Id at 985.
Id.
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strictive immunity approach.26 They also continued to defer to
the department’s case-by-case suggestions about whether to grant
immunity, in those cases in which the department made such suggestions,27 even where such suggestions were arguably contrary to
the Tate Letter.28 These suggestions sometimes included suggestions of immunity for foreign ofﬁcials.29 In the absence of a State
Department suggestion, courts attempted to decide the immunity
issue in a manner that was consistent with the Tate Letter, although that letter did not provide much guidance about how to
distinguish between a foreign state’s public and private acts.30 A
two-track system eventually developed, in which in some cases a
foreign state would seek an immunity determination from the State
Department and in other cases the state would ask the court to
make its own determination.31 The result was that “sovereign immunity determinations were made in two different branches, subject to a variety of factors, sometimes including diplomatic considerations.”32 Perhaps not surprisingly, this regime did not always
produce consistent decisions. The State Department also found
itself acting as an adjudicative body, a role that it was ill equipped
to perform, and it was frequently lobbied and pressured by foreign
states to support their requests for immunity.33
26
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, pt IV, ch 5, Introductory Note
at 392 (cited in note 4) (noting that after the Tate Letter the “courts in the United States
also adopted the restrictive theory and developed criteria for its application”).
27
See, for example, Spacil v Crowe, 489 F2d 614, 616 –17 (5th Cir 1974); Isbrandtsen
Tankers, Inc. v President of India, 446 F2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir 1971).
28
See, for example, Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity—The Case of the “Imias,” 68 Am
J Intl L 280, 281 (1974), citing Rich v Naviera Vacuba, SA, 295 F2d 24 (4th Cir 1961),
and Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v Republic of Venezuela, 215 A2d 864 (Pa 1966).
29
See, for example, Greenspan v Crosbie, No 74 Civ 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841, at *2
(SDNY, Nov 23, 1976) (“The Suggestion of Immunity removes the individual defendants
from this case.”).
30
See, for example, Victory Transport, Inc. v Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F2d 354, 360 (2d Cir 1964).
31
See id at 358 (“A claim of sovereign immunity may be presented to the court by
either of two procedures. The foreign sovereign may request its claim of immunity be
recognized by the State Department, which will normally present its suggestion to the
court through the Attorney General or some law ofﬁcer acting under his direction. Alternatively, the accredited and recognized representative of the foreign sovereign may
present the claim of sovereign immunity directly to the court.”).
32
Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 487 (1983).
33
For discussion of some of the problems posed by the Tate Letter regime, see Leigh,
68 Am J Intl L at 281–82 (cited in note 28), and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a
Sovereign Immunity Claim—The Haiti Case, 49 NYU L Rev 377, 389–90 (1974).
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In 1976, with the State Department’s support, Congress enacted
the FSIA.34 The statute comprehensively regulates the issue of
foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. courts and provides the exclusive basis for jurisdiction over civil suits against foreign states.35
The FSIA’s legislative history makes clear that the statute was
designed to “codify the so-called ‘restrictive’ principle of sovereign
immunity, as presently recognized in international law.”36 Indeed,
the statute’s ﬁndings and declaration of purpose speciﬁcally provide that “[u]nder international law, states are not immune from
the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them
in connection with their commercial activities.”37 The FSIA also
reﬂected an effort by Congress to transfer immunity determinations solely to the judiciary and away from the Executive Branch.
As noted in the legislative history, under the FSIA “sovereign
immunity decisions [would be] made exclusively by the courts and
not by a foreign affairs agency.”38
The FSIA provides that foreign states “shall be immune” from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts except as provided in certain speciﬁed exceptions.39 Consistent with the restrictive theory of immunity, the FSIA has a broad exception to immunity for cases
involving commercial activity.40 It also has an exception to immunity for tort claims, but this exception applies only if the damage or injury from the tort occurs within the United States.41
There is no express reference in the FSIA to suits against individual
34
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976),
codiﬁed at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1602–11.
35
See Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc., 504 US 607, 610 (1992); Argentine Republic
v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 US 428, 434–39 (1989).
36
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, HR Rep No 94-1487, 94th Cong, 2d
Sess 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 6604, 6605.
37

28 USC § 1602.

38

HR Rep No 94-1487 at 7 (cited in note 36); see also Altmann, 541 US at 691 (noting
that the FSIA “transfers primary responsibility for immunity determinations from the
Executive to the Judicial Branch”).
39
See 28 USC § 1604.
40
41

28 USC § 1605(a)(2).

See 28 USC § 1605(a)(5). Since 1996, the FSIA has had an exception for certain
egregious torts committed by designated “state sponsors of terrorism,” but this exception
currently applies to only four nations: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. For the latest version
of this exception, see 28 USC § 1605A.
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ofﬁcials. The statute applies to suits against “foreign state[s],”
which is deﬁned to “include[] a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”42 An
“agency or instrumentality” is in turn deﬁned as “a separate legal
person, corporate or otherwise . . . which is an organ of a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof.”43
b. human rights litigation
As a result of its limited exception for tort claims, the FSIA
generally does not permit suits in U.S. courts against foreign states
for human rights abuses committed abroad. International human
rights litigation has nevertheless ﬂourished in the United States
during the last thirty years. The foundational decision was the
Second Circuit’s 1980 decision in Filartiga v Peña-Irala.44 That
case involved a suit by two Paraguayan citizens against a former
Paraguayan police inspector for allegedly torturing and killing
their family member in Paraguay. For subject matter jurisdiction,
the plaintiffs relied on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a provision
that dates back to the First Judiciary Act of 1789 and states that
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”45 In allowing the
case to proceed, the court in Filartiga famously held that foreign
victims of human rights abuses committed abroad could use this
statute to sue for violations of CIL, including violations of customary human rights norms.46 Since this decision, numerous suits
have been brought under the ATS concerning human rights abuses
from around the world.47
42

28 USC § 1603(a).

43

See 28 USC § 1603(b)(1), (2). In addition, to qualify as an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state, the entity must be neither a U.S. citizen as deﬁned in provisions
governing diversity jurisdiction involving corporations nor created under the laws of a
third country. 28 USC § 1603(b)(3).
44
630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
45

Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 USC § 1350.

46

See Filartiga, 630 F2d at 887–88 (“This is undeniably an action by an alien, for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations.”).
47
The Second Circuit assumed for the sake of argument that the ATS is only a jurisdictional statute that does not create any substantive rights. See id at 887. In 2004, the
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Even though the defendant in Filartiga was a state ofﬁcial at
the time of the alleged acts, and even though most violations of
international law (including torture) require state action, there was
no discussion in Filartiga of whether the suit implicated Paraguay’s
sovereign immunity.48 The court’s only mention of immunity was
an observation that the defendant had not claimed diplomatic immunity.49 Nor did the parties, or the United States as amicus curiae, raise the sovereign immunity issue.50
Ten years after Filartiga, the Ninth Circuit issued what was to
become an inﬂuential decision holding that suits against foreign
ofﬁcials, for actions taken in their ofﬁcial capacity, constitute suits
against the foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. In Chuidian v
Philippine National Bank,51 the Marcos government of the Philippines had issued a letter of credit to Chuidian, payable through
the Philippine National Bank, as part of a litigation settlement.
An ofﬁcial in the new Aquino government stopped payment on
the letter of credit out of a concern that the former government
might have given it to Chuidian to keep him quiet about its wrongdoing. Chuidian sued both the national bank and the ofﬁcial. The
national bank obviously was an agency or instrumentality of the
Philippines for purposes of the FSIA. The issue was whether the
individual ofﬁcial was also covered by the FSIA. The Ninth Circuit
considered three possibilities: the ofﬁcial was entitled to no imSupreme Court conﬁrmed this assumption, while also holding that courts are authorized
to recognize a modest number of common law causes of action for violations of international law when exercising jurisdiction under the ATS. See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542
US 692, 713–14, 724 (2004).
48
The court did “note in passing,” however, that it doubted that the suit was barred
by the act of state doctrine, given that the alleged conduct was “in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratiﬁed by that nation’s
government.” Filartiga, 630 F2d at 889.
49
See id at 879.
50
See Appellants’ Brief, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, No 79-6090 (2d Cir, ﬁled July 25, 1979)
(available on Westlaw at 1979 WL 200205); Defendant-Appellee’s Brief in Support of
Judgment of Dismissal, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, No 79-6090 (2d Cir, ﬁled Sept 19, 1979)
(available on Westlaw at 1979 WL 200206); Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, No 79-6090 (2d Cir, ﬁled June 6, 1980) (available on Westlaw
at 1980 WL 340146). One amicus brief discussed the FSIA and argued that it was inapplicable because the defendant had not shown that he was “invested with sovereign
authority” to carry out the acts alleged by the plaintiff, and because the Paraguayan
government had not asserted immunity on his behalf. See Brief of the International Human
Rights Law Group, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and the Washington Ofﬁce on
Latin America as Amici Curiae Urging Reversal, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, No 79-6090, *30
(2d Cir, ﬁled July 23, 1979) (available on Westlaw at 1979 WL 200209).
51
912 F2d 1095 (9th Cir 1990).
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munity whatsoever; the ofﬁcial was covered by the FSIA as an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state; or the ofﬁcial was not
covered by the FSIA but was entitled to immunity under common
law principles.
The Executive Branch ﬁled an amicus curiae brief supporting
the third, common law approach. The Ninth Circuit, however,
adopted the second approach and applied the FSIA to the claim
against the ofﬁcial.52 The court noted that neither the text of the
FSIA nor its legislative history speciﬁcally excluded individuals,
and it reasoned that failing to apply the statute to these sorts of
suits would undermine the policies of the act.53 If no immunity
were allowed in this situation, the court reasoned, the act’s limitations could be circumvented by pleading: litigants could “accomplish indirectly what the [FSIA] barred them from doing directly.”54 Alternatively, if immunity were to be determined by the
common law, the court reasoned, Congress’s effort in the FSIA
to regulate foreign sovereign immunity and its exceptions comprehensively would be undermined.55 The Ninth Circuit also
noted that under a common law approach courts likely would feel
obligated to defer to the case-by-case views of the State Department, as they had done before the enactment of the FSIA, even
though one of the purposes of the statute was to shift immunity
determinations away from the Executive Branch.56
Over time, most circuit courts that considered the issue agreed
with the reasoning in Chuidian.57 At ﬁrst, these decisions had little
effect on international human rights litigation. The court in Chuidian had noted that the FSIA applied only to actions taken by
ofﬁcials in their ofﬁcial rather than personal capacity,58 and most
52

Id at 1103.

53

Id at 1102–03.
Id at 1102.

54
55

See Chuidian, 912 F2d at 1102.

56

See id at 1102–03.

57

See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F3d 71, 81 (2d Cir 2009); Keller v
Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F3d 811, 815–16 (6th Cir 2002); Byrd v Corporacion Forestal
y Industrial de Olancho, SA, 182 F3d 380, 388–89 (5th Cir 1999); El-Fadl v Central Bank
of Jordan, 75 F3d 668, 671 (DC Cir 1996). Courts concluded, however, that the FSIA did
not apply to suits against heads of state and that such suits were instead governed by the
pre-FSIA immunity regime, including deference to the Executive Branch. See, for example,
Ye v Zemin, 383 F3d 620, 625 (7th Cir 2004); United States v Noriega, 117 F3d 1206, 1212
(11th Cir 1997); Lafontant v Aristide, 844 F Supp 128, 136–37 (EDNY 1994).
58
See Chuidian, 912 F2d at 1106 (“Plainly [the defendant] would not be entitled to
sovereign immunity for acts not committed in his ofﬁcial capacity.”).
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courts concluded that, when ofﬁcials committed human rights
abuses, they were not acting in an ofﬁcial capacity. The rationales
for this conclusion were somewhat unclear. Several courts referred
to foreign law to determine the scope of the ofﬁcial’s authority
and found, without extended analysis, that the alleged human
rights violations exceeded anything that could plausibly be considered within that authority. Other courts appear to have assumed
that human rights abuses are per se unauthorized acts. In general,
these decisions did not consider the CIL of foreign ofﬁcial immunity.59
Two years after Chuidian, Congress legislated in the area of
human rights litigation by enacting, in 1992, the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA).60 Subject to certain limitations, the TVPA,
codiﬁed as a note to the ATS, creates a cause of action for damages
against individuals who, “under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation,” commit acts of torture or
“extrajudicial killing.”61 Although the text of the TVPA does not
mention immunity, there are several ambiguous references to immunity in its legislative history.62
Eventually, greater conﬂict developed between the Chuidian line
of decisions and human rights litigation. In several cases alleging
war crimes and human rights violations by Israeli ofﬁcials, courts
held that suits against foreign ofﬁcials for their ofﬁcial acts, even
if those acts constituted human rights abuses, were covered by the
FSIA.63 As one court explained, “[a]ll allegations stem from actions
taken on behalf of the state and, in essence, the personal capacity
59
See, for example, Hilao v Estate of Marcos, 25 F3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir 1994); Trajano
v Marcos, 978 F2d 493, 498 (9th Cir 1992); Doe I v Qi, 349 F Supp 2d 1258, 1282, 1287
(ND Cal 2004); Cabiri v Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F Supp 1189, 1198 (SDNY 1996); Xuncax
v Gramajo, 886 F Supp 162, 175–76 (D Mass 1995); Paul v Avril, 812 F Supp 207, 212
(SD Fla 1993); Forti v Suarez-Mason, 672 F Supp 1531, 1546 (ND Cal 1987). But see
Matar v Dichter, 563 F3d 9, 15 (2d Cir 2009) (“A claim premised on the violation of jus
cogens does not withstand foreign sovereign immunity.”).
60
See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73
(1992), codiﬁed at 28 USC § 1350 note.
61

28 USC § 1350 note.

62

These references are discussed below in Section C of Part III.

63

See Belhas v Ya’alon, 515 F3d 1279, 1284 (DC Cir 2008); Matar v Dichter, 500 F Supp
2d 284, 291 (SDNY 2009), aff ’d on other grounds, 563 F3d 9 (2d Cir 2009); Doe I v State
of Israel, 400 F Supp 2d 86, 104 –05 (DDC 2005). The Second Circuit also applied the
reasoning of Chuidian to a suit brought against (among others) four Saudi Arabian princes
in which it was alleged that the princes had facilitated the September 11 terrorist attacks.
See Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F3d at 83–85.
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suits amount to suits against the ofﬁcers for being Israeli government ofﬁcials.”64 The Seventh Circuit interpreted the FSIA differently, however, in a case brought against a former Nigerian
general for acts of torture and killing in Nigeria. This court reasoned that “[i]f Congress meant to include individuals acting in
the ofﬁcial capacity in the scope of the FSIA, it would have done
so in clear and unmistakable terms.”65 The court also noted that
it had held in another case that the FSIA did not apply to suits
against heads of state, and it asked rhetorically, “[h]ow much less,
then, could the statute apply to persons, like [the general in this
case], when he was simply a member of a committee, even if, as
seems likely, a committee that ran the country?”66
c. the samantar case
The conﬂict among the courts of appeals deepened with the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Samantar. The plaintiffs in that case
were members of the Isaaq clan in Somalia. They alleged that the
defendant, Mohamed Ali Samantar, a former Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense of Somalia, was responsible for human rights
abuses perpetrated against the Isaaq and other Somali clans who
opposed the country’s Supreme Revolutionary Council. The council, which seized power in a 1969 coup in which Samantar participated, responded to growing political opposition in the 1980s
by “terroriz[ing] the civilian population” with “widespread and
systematic use of torture, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killing.”67 The plaintiffs and their family members were victims of
this policy. In 2004, they ﬁled a complaint in a federal district
court in Virginia, alleging that Samantar was responsible for these
human rights violations because, in his capacity as Prime Minister
(a position he held from January 1987 to September 1990) and
Minister of Defense (an ofﬁce he occupied from January 1980 to
December 1986), “he knew or should have known about this conduct and, essentially, gave tacit approval for it.”68 The plaintiffs
sought damages under the ATS and the TVPA.
64

Doe I v Israel, 400 F Supp 2d at 105, citing El-Fadl, 75 F3d at 671.

65

Enahoro v Abubakar, 408 F3d 877, 881–82 (7th Cir 2005).
Id at 881, citing Ye, 383 F3d at 625.

66
67
68

Yousuf v Samantar, 552 F3d 371, 373–74 (4th Cir 2009).

Id. Samantar ﬂed to the United States in 1991 after the Council’s fall from power
and was living in Virginia at the time of suit. See id.
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Samantar moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FSIA
provided him with immunity from suit and deprived the district
court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court agreed,
adopting the reasoning of the Chuidian line of cases that the FSIA
applies to suits against foreign ofﬁcials for actions taken in their
ofﬁcial capacity. The court then considered the plaintiffs’ argument that Samantar’s conduct could not be considered ofﬁcial for
these purposes because it violated international norms. In rejecting
this argument, the court noted that the complaint “does not allege
that Samantar was acting on behalf of a personal motive or for
private reasons.”69 The court also assigned “great weight” to two
letters sent to the U.S. Department of State by the Prime Minister
and Deputy Prime Minister of the Somali Transitional Federal
Government,70 which asserted that Samantar was “acting within
the scope of his authority during the events at issue” and that his
actions were “taken . . . in his ofﬁcial capacities.”71 The court
further reasoned that allowing the lawsuit to proceed would effectively abrogate Somalia’s sovereign immunity by enabling the
plaintiffs to achieve “indirectly what the [FSIA] barred them from
doing directly.”72
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Fourth Circuit,
which reversed the district court’s immunity ruling. The court of
appeals analyzed the text of the FSIA’s “agency or instrumentality”
provision as well as the statute’s overall structure, purpose, and
legislative history. It reasoned that, in choosing the words “separate legal person” in the FSIA, Congress intended to include
within the statute’s ambit only organizations and corporate entities, not individuals.73 The court also agreed with the plaintiffs
69
Yousuf v Samantar, 2007 WL 2220579, *11 (ED Va 2007). Each count of the complaint
contained the following statement: “Defendant Samantar’s acts or omission described
above and the acts committed by his subordinates against [plaintiffs] were committed
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of the government of Somalia.” First
Amended Complaint, Yousuf v Samantar, No 1:04 CV 1360 (LMB/BRP) ¶ 99 (ED Va,
ﬁled Jan 27, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL 6382922).
70
Samantar, 2007 WL 2220579 at *11. The district court had previously stayed the
proceedings “to determine whether the State Department planned to provide a Statement
of Interest” as the Somali ofﬁcials had requested. Id at *6. When, after two years, the
ofﬁcials’ request was “still under consideration,” the court reinstated the case to the active
docket and ruled on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id.
71
Id at *11.
72
Id at *14, quoting Chuidian, 912 F2d at 1102.
73

Samantar, 552 F3d at 379–80.
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that “even if an individual foreign ofﬁcial could be an ‘agency or
instrumentality under the FSIA,’ sovereign immunity would be
available only if the individual were still an ‘agency or instrumentality’ at the time of suit,” which Samantar clearly was not.74
Having concluded that the FSIA did not bar the plaintiffs’ ATS
and TVPA claims, the Fourth Circuit declined to address Samantar’s alternative argument that he was “shielded from suit by a
common law immunity doctrine such as head-of-state immunity.”75 Instead, it directed the district court to consider that issue
on remand.
The Supreme Court afﬁrmed. While acknowledging that the
petitioner’s interpretation of the FSIA as extending to suits against
foreign ofﬁcials for their ofﬁcial acts was “literally possible,” the
Court said that its “analysis of the entire statutory text persuades
us that petitioner’s reading is not the meaning that Congress enacted.”76 “Reading the FSIA as a whole,” said the Court, “there
is nothing to suggest we should read ‘foreign state’ in [the statute]
to include an ofﬁcial acting on behalf of the foreign state, and
much to indicate that this meaning was not what Congress enacted.”77 The Court also considered the background, purposes,
and legislative history of the FSIA and concluded that, although
Congress had in that statute attempted to codify the common law
governing state sovereign immunity, it had not attempted to codify
the separate common law “ﬁeld” of foreign ofﬁcial immunity.78
Finally, the Court disagreed with the petitioner’s contention
that, unless the FSIA applied to suits against foreign ofﬁcials,
plaintiffs could easily circumvent the FSIA’s immunity protections
by suing responsible ofﬁcials rather than the state. Among other
things, the Court noted that, “[e]ven if a suit is not governed by
the [FSIA], it may still be barred by foreign sovereign immunity

74
Id at 383. In Dole Food Co. v Patrickson, 538 US 468 (2003), the Supreme Court held
that the determination of whether an entity qualiﬁes as an “instrumentality” of a foreign
state for purposes of the FSIA should be based upon the facts that exist at the time of
the lawsuit rather than at the time of the defendant’s conduct. See id at 478–80.
75
Samantar, 552 F3d at 383; see also id at 383–84 (noting Samantar’s reliance on an
“immunity doctrine arising under pre-FSIA common law”).
76
77
78

Samantar, 130 S Ct at 2286.
Id at 2289 (footnote omitted).
Id at 2289–90.
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under the common law.”79 The Court did not, however, provide
any guidance about the contours of this possible common law
immunity. Emphasizing the “narrowness” of its holding, the Court
observed that, “[w]hether petitioner may be entitled to immunity
under the common law, and whether he may have other valid
defenses to the grave charges against him, are matters to be addressed in the ﬁrst instance by the District Court on remand.”80
d. lack of consideration of international law
Although seemingly straightforward, the Samantar decision is
noteworthy for what is missing from the Court’s analysis, namely,
any consideration of what international law might have to say
about immunity in suits brought against foreign ofﬁcials. This
omission is signiﬁcant for a number of reasons.
First, as explained above, the FSIA was intended to codify principles of international law relating to sovereign immunity. Indeed,
the Court had acknowledged only a few years before Samantar
that the FSIA had “two well-recognized and related purposes”—
the “adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign immunity and
codiﬁcation of international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment.”81 Although the Supreme Court has sometimes stated that
sovereign immunity “is a matter of grace and comity on the part
of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution,”82 it has never denied that immunity also implicates principles of international law, and that is also the widespread view of
commentators and of courts in other nations.83 In light of this,
79
Id at 2292. The Court also described two other limitations that mitigated “the risk
that plaintiffs may use artful pleading to attempt to select between application of the FSIA
or the common law.” Id. First, “the foreign state itself, its political subdivision, or an
agency or instrumentality [may be] a required party,” a result that might result in dismissal
of the suit “regardless of whether the ofﬁcial is immune or not under the common law.”
Id. Second, “some actions against an ofﬁcial in his ofﬁcial capacity should be treated as
actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real party in interest.” Id. In both
of these instances, the FSIA would presumably be brought back into play and determine
whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.
80
Id at 2292–93.
81
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City of New York, 551 US 193, 199
(2007). The Court in Samantar acknowledged this point, noting further that it had previously “examined the relevant common law and international practice when interpreting
the [FSIA].” Samantar, 130 S Ct at 2289 (emphasis added).
82
Verlinden, 461 US at 486.
83
See, for example, Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity 13 (Oxford, 2d ed 2008)
(“That immunity is a rule of law is generally acknowledged by States.”); Restatement
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one might have expected the Court to consider what international
law had to say—at least as of 1976—about whether and to what
extent the immunity of a state was triggered by a suit against the
state’s ofﬁcials.
Second, many of the briefs submitted to the Court in Samantar
discussed international law. The petitioner devoted several pages
of his brief to the topic, contending that “international law in
1976 extended the state’s immunity to its ofﬁcials for the obvious
reason that, since the state can only act through its ofﬁcials, those
ofﬁcials are indistinguishable from the state itself, so stripping
their immunity would substantially undermine the state’s immunity.”84 Several of the amicus briefs submitted in support of the
petitioner, especially the brief submitted by the American Jewish
Congress, elaborated in detail on the contours of foreign ofﬁcial
immunity under international law.85 On the other side of the case,
the respondents, while emphasizing the FSIA’s text, argued at
length that international law did not require immunity in damages
suits brought against individual ofﬁcials.86 Some of the amicus
briefs in support of the respondents, most notably the brief submitted on behalf of a group of international law professors, elaborated on this argument.87
Third, there is a well-settled canon of construction pursuant to
which courts will interpret federal statutes, when reasonably possible, in a manner that avoids violations of international law.88
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, pt IV, ch 5, Introductory Note at 390 (cited in note
4) (“The immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an
undisputed principle of customary international law.”); Green Haywood Hackworth, 2
Digest of International Law § 169 (1941) (“While it is sometimes stated that [jurisdictional
exemptions for sovereigns] are based upon international comity or courtesy, and while
they doubtless ﬁnd their origin therein, they may now said to be based upon generally
accepted custom and usage, i.e. international law.”).
84
Brief of Petitioner, Samantar v Yousuf, No 08-1555, *21–*22 (ﬁled Nov 30, 2009)
(“Brief of Petitioner”) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 4320417); see also id at *35–
*41.
85
See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress in Support of Petitioner,
Samantar v Yousuf, No 08-1555, *10 –*28 (ﬁled Dec 4, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009
WL 4709540).
86
Brief for the Respondents, Samantar v Yousuf, No 08-1555, *39–*48 (ﬁled Jan 20,
2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 265636).
87
See Brief of Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law as Amici
in Support of Respondents, Samantar v Yousuf, No 08-1555, *14 –*34 (ﬁled Jan 27, 2010)
(available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 342033).
88
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 114 (cited in note 4); Murray
v Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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Samantar invoked this “Charming Betsy” canon and argued that a
denial of immunity in the case would violate CIL.89 This invocation of the Charming Betsy canon prompted the decision’s only
reference to international law. In a short footnote, the Court
stated:
We ﬁnd similarly inapposite petitioner’s invocation of the canon that
a statute should be interpreted in compliance with international law,
see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, [6 U.S.] 2 Cranch 64, 118
(1804), and his argument that foreign relations and the reciprocal protection of United States ofﬁcials abroad would be undermined if we do
not adopt his reading of the Act. Because we are not deciding that the
FSIA bars petitioner’s immunity but rather that the Act does not address
the question, we need not determine whether declining to afford immunity to petitioner would be consistent with international law.90

Technically, the Court was correct. Even if CIL requires the
conferral of immunity in suits against foreign ofﬁcials, the United
States would still be in compliance with international law if it
conferred this immunity through application of the common law
rather than through a statute. As a result, the Court’s interpretation of the FSIA—whereby the statute does not address the issue
of immunity in suits against foreign ofﬁcials but instead leaves that
issue to be resolved through the common law—does not necessarily place the United States in breach of international law. Nevertheless, the Court has at other times assumed that Congress has
not left open the issue of international law compliance. Perhaps
most notably, the Court in Hamdan v Rumsfeld,91 in construing the
references in the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the use of
military commissions, assumed that Congress intended to require
compliance with international law.92 The Court’s opinion in Hamdan, moreover, was authored by Justice Stevens, the same Justice
who wrote the opinion in Samantar.93
A ﬁnal reason why the omission of international law in Samantar
89

See Brief of Petitioner at *40 (cited in note 84).

90

Samantar, 130 S Ct at 2290 n 14.

91

548 US 557 (2006).

92

See id at 625–35.

93

The comprehensive nature of the FSIA, and Congress’s desire to shift immunity
determinations away from the Executive Branch, might also have weighed against the
conclusion that Congress had allowed the pre-1976 common law regime to continue.
Consider also Altmann, 541 US at 699 (noting that “Congress established a comprehensive
framework for resolving any claim of sovereign immunity”).
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is noteworthy concerns recent judicial rulings from other countries
that have taken account of the CIL of immunity when construing
similar statutory provisions. For example, the British House of
Lords, in a 2006 decision that was discussed extensively in the
briefs, relied heavily on international law in construing the word
“State” in Britain’s State Immunity Act to encompass foreign ofﬁcials acting in an ofﬁcial capacity.94 The structure of the British
statute is similar to that of the FSIA and, like the FSIA, does not
expressly cover suits against individual ofﬁcials. Nevertheless, in
large part because of what it believed international law to require,
the House of Lords concluded that the statute should be construed
to apply to such suits.95
Regardless of whether foreign court decisions such as this one
correctly assessed the current state of CIL immunity for foreign
ofﬁcials (an issue we address below in Part II), they demonstrate
the potential relevance of international law to the construction of
foreign sovereign immunity statutes. It is unclear why the Justices
in Samantar did not at least consider whether those decisions or
other sources of international law might be instructive. By contrast, only three years earlier, in Permanent Mission of India to the
U.N. v City of New York,96 the Court considered “international
practice at the time of the FSIA’s enactment” when construing an
ambiguity in the statute.97 The authorities that the Court referenced there included a multilateral treaty on diplomatic immunity,
a report of the International Law Commission, and judicial decisions from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.98
Of course, even if the Court had taken account of international
law in Samantar, it might still have reached the same conclusion
as a matter of statutory interpretation. Regardless of whether international law requires the conferral of immunity in suits alleging
94

See Jones v Saudi Arabia, 129 Intl L Rep 713 (House of Lords 2006).

95

See, for example, id at 717–18, ¶ 10 (Lord Bingham) (reasoning that when a foreign
state’s ofﬁcials are sued for acts taken within the foreign state, there is a “wealth of
authority” in support of allowing the foreign state to “claim immunity for its servants as it
could if sued itself”). See also, for example, Zhang v Zemin, NSWSC 1296, ¶¶ 20–23 (New
South Wales S Ct), online at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/scjudgments/2008nswsc.nsf/2008
nswsc.nsf/WebView2/716C1BB1E68711A3CA25751500191BE0?OpenDocument (construing the Foreign States Immunities Act of Australia, in light of international law, as extending
immunity “to members of the foreign government through whom the State acts”).
96
551 US 193 (2007).
97
Id at 200.
98

Id at 201.
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human rights violations by foreign ofﬁcials, the Court could reasonably have concluded that Congress did not address that issue
in the FSIA. There were, after all, relatively few suits against
foreign ofﬁcials prior to the FSIA’s enactment in 1976, and there
is no mention of them in the FSIA’s legislative history.99 In subsequent years, the Filartiga line of cases and other developments
have made the issue much more salient, but Congress probably
did not anticipate that development.
Seen in this light, the case might have raised the question of
whether the Court should, in effect, adjust or update the FSIA to
address an issue not speciﬁcally considered by Congress. There
are institutional arguments against such judicial updating, although these considerations may have been tempered by the longstanding nature of the Chuidian line of cases and Congress’s failure
to overturn those cases’ construction of the statute. Moreover, in
other contexts, the Court has attempted to translate statutory purposes to take account of current conditions; indeed, the Court
expressly did so when interpreting the ATS to allow for modern
human rights litigation.100 In any event, the Court in Samantar
never addressed this question because it did not expressly consider
the international law backdrop of the case.
II. The Immunity of Foreign Ofﬁcials Under Customary
International Law
In this part, we consider the extent to which foreign ofﬁcials
are entitled to immunity in other nations’ courts as a matter of
99
See Samantar, 130 S Ct at 2291 n 18 (noting that “[a] study that attempted to gather
all of the State Department decisions related to sovereign immunity from the adoption
of the restrictive theory in 1952 to the enactment of the FSIA reveals only four decisions
related to ofﬁcial immunity, and two related to head of state immunity, out of a total of
110 decisions”). Mark Feldman, a participant in the drafting of the FSIA, explained the
statute’s silence on the issue of head-of-state immunity (a status immunity under international law for certain high-level ofﬁcials) as follows: “Frankly, we forgot about it, or
didn’t know enough about it at the time, during those two or three critical years when
the statute was being formulated.” Panel, Foreign Governments in United States Courts, 85
Am Socy Intl L Proc 251, 276 (1991).
100
See Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 725 (2004); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Jack
L. Goldsmith, and David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv L Rev 869, 873 (2007) (explaining that Sosa “was, in effect, a
translation of the speciﬁc intentions of the [Alien Tort Statute] framers to the regime of
post-Erie federal common law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 682–83 (Foundation, 6th ed 2009) (discussing the
translation issue presented in Sosa).
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CIL. As noted above, CIL arises from state practice that is followed out of a sense of legal obligation. For the issue of foreign
ofﬁcial immunity, the most relevant state practice will likely be
the decisions of national courts.101 The decisions of international
tribunals, even if not technically part of state practice,102 will also
be relevant, in that they may reﬂect consensus or create expectations about the relevant legal principles.103
A review of these materials shows that CIL has long distinguished between immunity based on the status of a government
ofﬁcial and immunity based on the subject matter of an ofﬁcial’s
conduct. With respect to the ﬁrst type of immunity, referred to
as “status immunity” or “immunity ratione personae,” certain ofﬁcials
such as diplomats and “heads of state” (a category that includes
presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, and foreign ministers) are
immune from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of other nations’
courts.104 The rationales for granting status immunity are threefold:
“to ensure the effective performance of [the ofﬁcials’] functions on
behalf of their respective States”;105 to facilitate “the proper functioning of the network of mutual inter-State relations”;106 and to
preserve the sovereign equality and dignity of the state itself, which
101
See International Law Association, Committee on Formation of Customary (General)
International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary
International Law § 9, cmt d (2000) (“Domestic courts, too, are organs of the State, and
their decisions should also be treated as part of the practice of the State. . . . [such as
with] a determination that international law does or does not require State immunity to
be accorded in a particular case . . . .”).
102
See id at § 10.
103
Although there is general agreement on the deﬁnition of CIL, there are many theoretical debates and uncertainties surrounding its application. These include how extensive
and widespread state practice must be, how quickly CIL can develop, and the circularity
of requiring nations to act out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) before they are
bound to an emerging custom. See Curtis A. Bradley and Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from
International Custom, 120 Yale L J 202, 210 –11 (2010). We do not engage with these
debates in this article, but the materials that we rely on in discussing the CIL of foreign
ofﬁcial immunity are relatively standard for this topic.
104
In addition to diplomatic and head-of-state immunity, foreign ofﬁcials who participate
in task-speciﬁc visits to other states may enjoy “special mission immunity,” a doctrine
recognized in CIL and in the Convention on Special Missions, Dec 8, 1969, 1410 UNTS
231. See, for example, Li v Bo, 568 F Supp 2d 35 (DDC 2008) (deferring to Executive
suggestion of special mission immunity).
105
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v Belgium) (merits), 2002 ICJ Rep 3, 22 at ¶ 53.
106
Immunity of State Ofﬁcials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Prepared
by the Secretariat, International Law Commission, 60th Sess (Mar 31, 2008), UN Doc A/
CN.4/596 36 at ¶ 148 (“ILC Secretariat Memorandum”).
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the ofﬁcial embodies. Status immunity is substantively broad; it
applies to all claims against the ofﬁcial, regardless of whether they
concern public or private acts or whether the acts took place during
the ofﬁcial’s time in ofﬁce. But status immunity is also temporary;
it ends when the ofﬁcial leaves ofﬁce.
The second type of immunity is “conduct immunity” or “immunity ratione materiae.” Unlike status immunity, conduct immunity
“covers only ofﬁcial acts, that is, conduct adopted by a State ofﬁcial
in the discharge of his or her functions.”107 The rationales for conduct immunity are linked to its scope. Since a state can only act
through its ofﬁcials, the state’s immunity would be undermined if
those ofﬁcials could be sued for acts carried out on the state’s behalf.
A related justiﬁcation is that “a state ofﬁcial is not accountable to
other states for acts that he accomplishes in his ofﬁcial capacity and
that therefore must be attributed to the state” under the international law of state responsibility.108 Inasmuch as conduct immunity
is based on the individual’s actions and not his personal status, it
extends to all government ofﬁcials who carry out state functions.
For the same reason, conduct immunity does not depend on
whether the ofﬁcial is currently in ofﬁce and thus applies equally
to former ofﬁcials.109
Traditionally, CIL has extended immunity ratione materiae to ofﬁcials sued or prosecuted in foreign courts for conduct that is imputable to their state. Hazel Fox, a leading expert on foreign sovereign immunity, describes this traditional view:
An individual enjoys no immunity in his or her own right. But a State
as an artiﬁcial person created by the law can act only by means of individual human beings. Under municipal law acts performed by an agent
on behalf of another may give rise to liability on behalf of both principal
and agent or, where the agent is understood purely as a conduit, a means
of communication, give rise to sole liability on the part of the principal.
The doctrine of imputability of the acts of the individual to the State
has in classical law assumed the second analysis to be correct and con107
Id at ¶ 154; see also Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (Djibouti v France) (merits), 2008 ICJ 177, 243 at ¶ 191 (indicating that immunity
ratione materiae extends only to “acts within the scope of [ofﬁcials’] duties as organs of
State”).
108
See Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Ofﬁcials Be Tried for International Crimes?
Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 Eur J Intl L 853, 862 (2002).
109
As this description indicates, the two types of immunities sometimes overlap, such
as when a high-ranking ofﬁcial performs acts in the exercise of his or her ofﬁcial functions.
See id at 864.
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sequently imputes the act solely to the state, who alone is responsible
for its consequence. In consequence any act performed by the individual
as an act of the State enjoys the immunity which the State enjoys.110

This view that the conduct immunity of foreign ofﬁcials derives
from the CIL of foreign state immunity was understood as a general
rule, “any exception [to which] must be based on a special rule of
customary or conventional international law.”111 This approach is
also reﬂected in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States and their Property (“UN Immunities Convention”), a
proposed multilateral treaty that was endorsed by the UN General
Assembly in 2004.112 The Convention—which deﬁnes a “State” to
include “representatives of the State acting in that capacity”113—
provides as one of its “general principles” that “[a] State enjoys
immunity . . . from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State,”
and it expressly enumerates the limited exceptions to immunity in
“the provisions of the present Convention.”114
Over the last decade, however, a growing number of domestic
and international judicial decisions have considered whether a foreign ofﬁcial acts as an arm of the state, and thus is entitled to conduct
immunity, when that ofﬁcial allegedly violates a jus cogens norm of
international law or commits an international crime. A jus cogens
norm is a rule of international law that has been “accepted and
110
Fox, The Law of State Immunity at 455 (cited in note 83). See also, for example, Hans
Kelsen, Principles of International Law 235 (Rinehart, 1952) (explaining that “no state has
jurisdiction over another state . . . not only in case a state as such is sued in a court of
another state but also in case an individual is the defendant or the accused and the civil
or criminal delict for which the individual is prosecuted has the character of an act of
state”); Underhill, 168 US at 252.
111
Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular
Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 Cal L Rev 530, 551 (1943).
112
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Resolution
59/38, UN General Assembly, 59th Sess (Dec 2, 2004), UN Doc A/Res/59/38 Annex.
Although the Convention had not entered into force as of early 2011, many commentators
consider it as “the most authoritative restatement of current customary law on state immunity.” Thilo Rensmann, Impact on the Immunity of States and Their Ofﬁcials, in Menno
T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin, eds, The Impact of Human Rights Law on General
International Law 151, 153 (Oxford, 2009).
113
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, Art 2(b)(iv) (cited in note 112); see
also id at Art 6(2)(b) (“A proceeding before a court of a State shall be considered to have
been instituted against another State if that other State . . . is not named as a party to
the proceeding but the proceeding in effect seeks to affect the property, rights, interests
or activities of that other State”).
114
Id at Art 5; see also Christopher Keith Hall, UN Convention on State Immunity: The
Need for a Human Rights Protocol, 55 Intl & Comp L Q 411, 415 (2006) (“The Convention
establishes a broad general rule of immunity, subject to a number of limited exceptions.”).
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recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modiﬁed only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.”115 Norms commonly said to qualify as
jus cogens include the prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture.116 International crimes include genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.117 (For ease of reference, we label all of
these acts as jus cogens violations.)
The cases addressing the relationship between jus cogens norms
and immunity are numerous and varied. They include both criminal
prosecutions and civil suits for damages; complaints against both
serving and former heads of state, military ofﬁcers, and lower-level
government ofﬁcials; litigation in domestic courts; and proceedings
before international tribunals and review bodies. A review of this
burgeoning case law, as well as the drafting history of international
conventions, studies of expert bodies such as the International Law
Commission,118 and the writings of commentators that have interpreted these developments, suggests the following propositions.
First, sitting heads of state are entitled to status immunity in both
criminal investigations and prosecutions and in civil suits for damages in the domestic courts of other countries, including in cases
alleging violations of jus cogens.119 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) reafﬁrmed this principle in its 2002 judgment in the Arrest
115
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 53, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 332, 8 Intl
Leg Mat 679 (1969). The jus cogens category of international law is not free from controversy. See, for example, A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens,
as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 Mich J Intl L 1 (1995).
116

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702, cmt n (cited in note 4).
See, for example, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art 5, 2187
UN Treaty Ser 90 (1998).
118
The International Law Commission (ILC) is a body composed of twenty-four international law experts elected by the General Assembly to promote the codiﬁcation and
progressive development of international law, including by proposing draft conventions.
In 2007, the ILC began a study of the “immunity of State ofﬁcials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction” with the aim of making a contribution to ensuring a proper balance between
combating impunity for human rights abuses and stable and predictable interstate relations.
See Preliminary report on immunity of State ofﬁcials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, International Law Commission (Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur), 60th Sess
(May 29, 2008), UN Doc A/CN4/601 9 at ¶ 17–18. In 2008, the ILC Secretariat published
a detailed analysis of state practice and national and international court decisions. ILC
Secretariat Memorandum (cited in note 106).
119
Immunity does not apply to international prosecutions for violations of jus cogens
norms because the treaties and statutes of international courts and tribunals expressly
abrogate both status and conduct immunity. See Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure 550–56 (Cambridge, 2d ed 2010).
117
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Warrant Case,120 which concerned a warrant for the arrest of the
foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo issued by a
magistrate judge in Belgium pursuant to that country’s “universal
jurisdiction” statute.121 The ICJ held that the warrant violated the
status immunity of incumbent foreign ministers, whose functions
as state representatives entitle them to “full immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability” during their term of ofﬁce even
against allegations “of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity.”122 National courts have consistently followed the
ICJ’s analysis and dismissed suits against sitting heads of state alleging jus cogens violations.123
Second, a growing number of international and national courts
have abrogated the conduct immunity of former heads of state as
well as current and former lower-level ofﬁcials from criminal investigations and prosecutions for jus cogens violations, especially
where international law provides a basis for exercising universal
jurisdiction. This trend can be traced to the Pinochet case,124 a watershed 1999 decision in which the British House of Lords held
that Chile’s former head of state could be extradited to Spain to
stand trial for torture. The majority opinions relied heavily on the
Convention Against Torture, in particular the provision authorizing
states parties to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction. According
to Lord Brown-Wilkinson, “the whole elaborate structure of universal jurisdiction over torture committed by ofﬁcials [would be]
rendered abortive and one of the main objectives of the Torture
Convention—to provide a system under which there is no safe haven
for torturers—[would be] frustrated”125 if former ofﬁcials charged
120
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v Belgium) (merits) 2002 ICJ 3.
121
When an offense falls within universal jurisdiction, all nations of the world are said
to have the authority to prosecute the offense. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 404, cmt a (cited in note 4).
122

Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 ICJ 3, at 22–24, ¶¶ 54, 58.
See, for example, Re General Shaul Mofaz, 128 Intl L Rep 709 (Dist Ct, Bow Street
2004) (Israeli Minister of Defense); Re Bo Xilai, 128 Intl L Rep 713 (Dist Ct, Bow Street
2005) (Chinese Minister for Commerce and International Trade); SOS Attentats et Béatrice
Castelnau d’Esnault c Gadafy, 125 Intl L Rep 490 (French Court of Cassation) (Mar 13,
2001) (Libyan head of state); Auto del Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 4 (Spanish Audiencia
Nacional 2008), at 151–57 (granting immunity to the President of Rwanda and noting
similar grants of immunity to Cuban President Fidel Castro, the King of Morocco, and
the President of Equatorial Guinea).
124
Regina v Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, 38 Intl Legal Mat 581 (House of Lords 1999).
123

125

Id at 595 (Lord Brown-Wilkinson).
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with torture were accorded conduct immunity. Consistent with this
reasoning, the court limited Pinochet’s extradition to allegations
that occurred after Chile, Spain, and the United Kingdom had all
ratiﬁed the Convention and after the United Kingdom had enacted
legislation making torture an extraterritorial crime.
In the decade following Pinochet, courts and prosecutors across
Europe and elsewhere have commenced criminal proceedings
against former ofﬁcials of other nations for torture and other violations of jus cogens.126 In Spain, criminal investigations are under
way against former heads of state, government ministers, and highlevel military ofﬁcials from Argentina, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Israel, Morocco, Rwanda, and the United States.127 In
France, prosecutors obtained convictions for torture in absentia
against a former Mauritanian army ofﬁcer128 and in personam against
a Tunisian ex-police chief.129 After the Netherlands amended its
criminal code to recognize status but not conduct immunity for jus
cogens violations,130 a former head of Afghan intelligence and his
deputy and a former Zairian army colonel were tried and convicted
of torture.131 A judge in Argentina is investigating the torture and
disappearances of political opponents of the Franco regime in
Spain.132 And in Italy, a Nazi army sergeant was convicted in absentia
126

For a review of recent cases in Europe, see ILC Secretariat Memorandum (cited in
note 106). See also The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction,
Council of the European Union, Council Secretariat (Apr 16, 2009), EU Doc 8672/1/09
Rev 1 24–26 at § 24(vii). For a thoughtful analysis of these cases, see Ed Bates, State
Immunity for Torture, 7 Hum Rts L Rev 651 (2007).
127
See Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, The Swan Song of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain,
9 Intl Crim L Rev 777, 778–80, 785–86 (2009); see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the
State Do Justice: Transnational Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations
in Post-Armed Conﬂict Guatemala, 9 Chi J Intl L 79 (2008).
128
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme v Ould Dah (Nı̂mes Assize
Ct 2005).
129
Gharbi v Ben Saı̈d (Strasbourg Assize Ct 2008); see also France Jails Tunisian Diplomat
for Torture, AFP, Dec 15, 2008, online at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5gTIWQI7cr9uGHdU-0zW5gfr0mjxA.
130
International Crimes Act 2003, Art 16 (excluding prosecutions of jus cogens violations
committed by “foreign heads of state, heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs,
as long as they are in ofﬁce”) (emphasis added); see also M. Boot-Matthijssen and R. van
Elst, Key Provisions of the International Crimes Act 2003, 35 Neth YB Intl L 251, 286–88
(2004) (analyzing the inﬂuence of the ICJ’s Arrest Warrant Case on the Act).
131
See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 Am J Intl L 212, 213 & n
32 (2006).
132
Giles Tremlett, Argentinian Judge Petitions Spain to Try Civil War Crimes of Franco,
The Guardian (Oct 26, 2010), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/26/
argentina-spain-general-franco-judge.
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of war crimes against Italian civilians during World War II.133 International courts and treaty bodies have also consistently upheld
assertions of criminal jurisdiction by domestic courts over former
ofﬁcials charged with torture.134 There are a few exceptions to this
trend,135 and several countries have recently narrowed their universal jurisdiction statutes in response to controversies engendered
by criminal complaints against foreign ofﬁcials.136 But these developments are unlikely to prevent the formation of a CIL exception
to conduct immunity in criminal proceedings involving alleged jus
cogens violations.137
Third, there has been less erosion to date of foreign ofﬁcial immunity in the civil context. Most noteworthy is a series of rulings
by the Court of Cassation of Italy asserting jurisdiction over civil
suits against Germany and German military ofﬁcers alleging jus
cogens violations committed in part on Italian territory during World
War II.138 But a number of other jurisdictions have rejected a jus
133
Criminal Proceedings Against Milde, 92 Rivista di diritto internazionale 61 (Italian Ct
of Cassation 2009), reprinted and translated in Oxford Rep Intl L in Dom Cts 1224
(discussing conviction in absentia by Military Court of First Instance of La Spezia and
subsequent civil proceedings).
134
See, for example, Case Concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite (Belgium v Senegal ), ICJ Order No 144 (May 28, 2009) (criminal proceedings
against ex-President of Chad for torture), online at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ﬁles/
144/15149.pdf; Communication No. 181/2001: Senegal, Committee Against Torture, 36th
Sess (May 19, 2006), UN Doc CAT/C/SR.646/Add.1 ¶¶ 9–11 (same); Ould Dah v France,
App No 13113/03 (Eur Ct Hum Rts 2009) (admissibility decision) (dismissing Mauritanian
ex-army ofﬁcer’s challenge to a conviction for torture by a French court and afﬁrming
France’s authority to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over allegations of torture).
135
The two most prominent examples are a French prosecutor’s refusal, in 2008, to
investigate torture allegations against former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
Letter from Public Prosecutor (Procureur général), Court of Appeal of Paris, to Patrick
Baudouin (Feb 27, 2008), online at http://ccrjustice.org/ﬁles/Rumsfeld_FrenchCase
_ProsecutorsDecision_02_08.pdf, and a German federal prosecutor’s decision in 2005 to
recognize the conduct immunity of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin. See Human
Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art 64 (2006).
136
See, for example, de la Rasilla del Moral, 9 Intl Crim L Rev at 804 (cited in note
127) (discussing 2009 revision of Spain’s universal jurisdiction statute); Steven R. Ratner,
Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Post-Mortem, 97 Am J Intl L 888 (2003) (discussing 2003
revision of similar statute in Belgium); see also Police Reform and Social Responsibility
Bill, UK House of Commons (Nov 30, 2010), online at http://www.publications
.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmbills/116/11116.i-v.html (proposing amendment to the
United Kingdom’s universal jurisdiction statute to remove the exclusive power of local
magistrates to grant arrest warrants and require that all such warrants be approved by the
Director of Public Prosecutions).
137
The precise contours of this exception could be affected by the views of the ILC,
which has been studying the immunity of state ofﬁcials from foreign criminal jurisdiction
since 2007. See explanation and sources cited in note 118.
138
The leading Italian case is Ferrini v Germany, 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 539
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cogens exception to foreign ofﬁcial immunity in civil cases, including
appellate court decisions from Australia,139 New Zealand,140 and the
United Kingdom.141 Although not directly on point, the reasoning
of a decision from Canada is also consistent with this pro-immunity
position.142 Furthermore, although a decision from Greece seemed
to accept a jus cogens limitation on immunity, a subsequent decision
from another court in Greece reached the opposite conclusion.143
Jones v Saudi Arabia,144 a 2006 ruling of the British House of
Lords, is the leading case for the pro-immunity view. The plaintiffs
in Jones sued Saudi Arabia and several Saudi ofﬁcials (a colonel in
(Italian Ct of Cassation 2004), reprinted and translated in Oxford Rep Intl L in Dom Cts
19. For further analysis, see Andrea Gattini, War Crimes and State Immunity in the Ferrini
Decision, 3 J Intl Crim Just 224, 230 (2005). In addition, a few domestic courts in Europe
reviewing criminal prosecutions for jus cogens violations appear to have awarded damages
to victims. See Written Comments by Redress, Amnesty International, Interights, and
Justice, Jones v UK, App No 34356/06; Mitchell v UK, App No 40528/06, *6, at ¶ 21 (Eur
Ct Hum Rts, ﬁled Feb 24, 2010), online at http://www.interights.org/jones.
139
See Zhang v Zemin, NSWSC 1296, at ¶¶ 20–23 (New S Wales S Ct 2008), online
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supreme_ct/2008/1296.html; see also Habib v
Commonwealth of Australia, FCAFC 12, at ¶¶ 85, 115 (Fed Ct of Austl 2010) (in a suit
against Australian government for aiding and abetting torture by foreign ofﬁcials, the
court stated that it was “common ground” that “if the agents of Pakistan, Egypt and the
USA were sued directly in an Australian court for the alleged acts . . . those agents would
be entitled to invoke sovereign immunity,” citing Jones), online at http://www.austlii.edu
.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2010/12.html.
140
See Fang v Jiang, NZAR 420, ¶ 62 (High Ct of NZ 2007), reprinted in Oxford Rep
Intl L in Dom Cts 1226.
141

See Jones, 129 Intl L Rep 713, 726 at ¶ 24 (House of Lords 2006).
In Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran, 71 OR (3d) 675, at ¶ 95 (Ontario Ct of App
2004), the Court of Appeal concluded that Canada’s State Immunity Act, Section 2 of
which deﬁnes “foreign state” to include “any sovereign or other head of the foreign state
or of any political subdivision of the foreign state while acting as such in a public capacity,”
applied even to claims of torture. It should be noted, however, that the Committee Against
Torture—the body of human rights experts that reviews implementation of the Convention
Against Torture and issues nonbinding recommendations to states parties—expressed concern over this interpretation of the State Immunity Act when reviewing Canada’s periodic
report in 2005. See Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Canada, Committee Against Torture,
34th Sess (May 13, 2005), UN CAT/C/SR.646/Add.1.
143
In Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, Case No 11/2000 (Greek Ct of
Cassation 2000), the Greek Court of Cassation adopted an implied waiver theory to deny
immunity to Germany in a case alleging jus cogens violations by the German military in
Greece during World War II. See Maria Gavouneli and Elias Bantekas, Case Report: Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 95 Am J Intl L 198 (2001). The Greek
Special Supreme Court—convened to decide cases involving the interpretation of international law—later disagreed with the Court of Cassation and rejected the plaintiffs’
attempt to enforce the judgment against Germany. See Margellos v Federal Republic of
Germany, Case No 6/2002 (Greek Special S Ct 2002). For a discussion, see Elena Vournas,
Comment, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany: Sovereign Immunity and the
Exception for Jus Cogens Violations, 21 NY L Sch J Intl & Comp L 629, 648 (2002).
144
129 Intl L Rep 713 (House of Lords 2006).
142
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the Ministry of Interior, a deputy prison governor, and two police
ofﬁcers), whom they alleged were responsible for torture that occurred “in discharge or purported discharge of [their] duties.”145 As
with its earlier Pinochet decision, the House of Lords gave careful
consideration to the Convention Against Torture. It ﬁrst rejected
the plaintiffs’ contention that “torture . . . cannot attract immunity
ratione materiae because it cannot be an ofﬁcial act,”146 reasoning
that this contention was inconsistent with the treaty’s deﬁnition of
torture: acts “inﬂicted by or with the connivance of a public ofﬁcial
or other person acting in an ofﬁcial capacity.”147 The court also
reasoned that whereas the Convention implicitly abrogated immunity in criminal cases by authorizing universal jurisdiction, no
similar jurisdictional grant existed for civil suits.148 The court further
expressed the view that “[t]he foreign state’s right to immunity
cannot be circumvented by suing its servants or agents.”149 Finally,
the House of Lords denied that the recognition of immunity conﬂicted with torture’s unquestioned status as a jus cogens norm. By
refusing to allow the suit, the court asserted that it was not “justifying the use of torture”; rather, it was giving effect to “a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court” and “divert[ing] any breach of [jus cogens] to a different method of
settlement.”150
The leading decision supporting a jus cogens exception to immunity in civil suits is Ferrini v Germany,151 a case involving the
Nazi military’s deportation of the plaintiff from Italy to a German
145

Id at 714–18, ¶¶ 2–3, 11 (Lord Bingham).

146

Id at 744, ¶ 85 (Lord Hoffman).

147

Id at 723–24, ¶ 19 (Lord Bingham); see also id at 744, ¶¶ 83–84 (Lord Hoffman).

148

Id at ¶ 25 (Lord Bingham); id at 733–37, ¶¶ 46, 57 (Lord Hoffman).

149

Id at ¶ 10 (Lord Bingham); see also Bates, 7 Hum Rts L Rev at 655 (noting “the
Law Lords’ clear conclusion that the immunity ratione materiae that attached to the State
could not be circumvented by claims being brought against individuals who acted on behalf
of the State”) (cited in note 126); United States Matar Brief at 23 (statement by Executive
Branch that “there is broad agreement in international law that, where a foreign state is
immune, ‘[t]he foreign state’s right to immunity cannot be circumvented by suing its
servants or agents.’”) (quoting Jones).
150
See Jones, 129 Intl L Rep at 726, ¶ 24 (Lord Bingham); id at 732, ¶ 44 (Lord
Hoffman) (both quoting Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity 525 (Oxford, 1st ed 2004)).
For criticism of the court’s reasoning on this point, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, State
Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong, 18 Eur J Intl L
965 (2007).
151
87 Rivista di diritto internazionale 539 (Italian Ct of Cassation 2004), reprinted and
translated in Oxford Rep Intl L in Dom Cts 19.
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concentration camp. The Italian Court of Cassation characterized
the actions as “an expression of [Germany’s] sovereign power since
they were conducted during war operations.”152 But it refused to
recognize “the functional immunity of foreign state organs”153 for
acts that violate jus cogens, which stand “at the apex of the international system [and] tak[e] precedence over all other norms
whether of conventional or customary nature and therefore also
over those norms governing immunity.”154 In 2008 and 2009, the
Court of Cassation exercised jurisdiction over more than a dozen
additional complaints seeking damages for the German military’s
actions during World War II.155 The court reafﬁrmed that the clash
between jus cogens and immunity should be resolved on the basis of
“value judgments” and a “balancing of interests” that gives primacy
to legal principles of higher rank,156 and it deemphasized the fact
that the challenged conduct occurred partly in Italy.157
International tribunals have yet to take a deﬁnitive position on
whether there is a jus cogens exception to foreign ofﬁcial immunity
in civil cases. In Al-Adsani v United Kingdom,158 a Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held, by a sharply
divided 9–8 vote, that recognizing the immunity of foreign states
from civil suits alleging torture did not violate the right of access
to the courts protected by the European Convention on Human
Rights.159 Interpreting the Convention “in harmony with other rules
of international law . . . , including those relating to the grant of
152

Id at ¶ 7.

153

Id at ¶ 11.

154

Id at ¶ 9 (citations and internal quotations omitted). In support of this conclusion,
the Court of Cassation cited the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) Trial Chamber’s decision in Prosecutor v Furundzija, IT-95-17/I-T 59 at ¶ 155
(ICTY 1998), which “lists the possibility of victims ‘bringing civil suits for compensation
before Courts of a foreign state’ among the effects of the violation of [ jus cogens norms]
at ‘an inter-State level.’” Id ¶ 155.
155
See, for example, Germany v Mantelli, 45 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e
processuale 651 (Italian Ct of Cassation 2009), and Milde, Oxford Rep Intl L in Dom Cts
at 1224. For analysis of these decisions, see Annalisa Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation
Asserts Civil Jurisdiction over Germany in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War:
The Civitella Case, 7 J Intl Crim Just 597 (2008); Carlo Focarelli, Case Report: Federal
Republic of Germany v. Giovanni Mantelli and Others, Order No. 14201, 103 Am J Intl L
122 (2009).
156
Ciampi, 7 J Intl Crim Just at 603–04 (cited in note 155).
157
See Focarelli, 103 Am J Intl L at 126 (cited in note 155).
158
App No 35763/97 (Grand Chamber, Eur Ct Hum Rts 2001), online at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3fe6c7b54.html.
159

Id at 20.
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State immunity,”160 the ECHR concluded that, notwithstanding
“the special character of the prohibition of torture in international
law,” it was “unable to discern in the international instruments,
judicial authorities or other materials before it any ﬁrm basis for
concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no longer
enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where
acts of torture are alleged.”161 The dissenting judges, in contrast,
reasoned that the jus cogens character of torture overrides immunity,
which does not share its hierarchically superior status.162 Although
the majority rejected this view, it left open the possibility that CIL
might evolve to abrogate immunity from such suits.163
The conduct immunity of foreign ofﬁcials was not at issue in AlAdsani, but it has been raised in a pending ECHR challenge to
Jones.164 The key issue before the ECHR is whether the House of
Lords’ grant of immunity to the Saudi ofﬁcials violated the right
of access to the courts under the European Convention, even if the
recognition of Saudi Arabia’s immunity did not.165 In addition, Germany recently challenged the Ferrini line of cases before the ICJ,
asking the court to declare that, “by allowing civil claims based on
violations of international humanitarian law by the German Reich
during World War II,” Italy had “failed to respect the jurisdictional
immunity which . . . Germany enjoys under international law.”166
The CIL of foreign ofﬁcial immunity from civil damage claims is
160

Id at 16, ¶ 55.

161

Id at 18, ¶ 61.

162

See Al-Adsani, App No 35763/97 at 26, ¶ 3 (joint dissenting opinion).

163

See id at 19, ¶ 66.
See Jones v United Kingdom, App No 34356/06 (Eur Ct Hum Rts, ﬁled on July 26,
2006); Mitchell v United Kingdom, App No 40528/06 (Eur Ct Hum Rts, ﬁled on Sept 22,
2006).
165
Application Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties, Jones v UK and Mitchell
v UK (Eur Ct Hum Rts, ﬁled on Sept 18, 2009). The ECHR also asked the parties to
address whether European countries “allow civil proceedings to be brought against ofﬁcials
of another State and/or for compensation to be awarded to victims in criminal proceedings
brought against those ofﬁcials.” Id.
164

166
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), ICJ Press Release no 2008/44
(Dec 23, 2008) at 1, online at http://www.icj-cij.org/. In June 2010, the Italian Parliament
adopted a law that suspends until the end of 2011 the execution and enforcement of
judgments against a foreign state that has ﬁled a complaint with the ICJ against Italy on
matters relating to immunity. The law was “adopted in order to stop the enforcement of
proceedings pending before the Italian courts against Germany” during the pendency of
the ICJ proceedings in Germany v Italy. Andrea Atteritano, Immunity of States and Their
Organs: The Contribution of Italian Jurisprudence over the Past Ten Years, 19 Ital YB Intl L
33, 46 (2009).
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likely to remain unsettled at least until the ECHR and ICJ have
issued judgments in these cases.
A fourth principle that is emerging from recent national court
decisions—both those that uphold immunity and those that abrogate it—is that jus cogens violations committed by ofﬁcials are governmental rather than private acts.167 The rationales for this conclusion are ﬁrst, that illegal and ultra vires acts by ofﬁcials can be
attributable to the state under the international law of state responsibility,168 and, second, that proceedings against ofﬁcials for acts
carried out in an apparently ofﬁcial capacity are equivalent to proceedings against the foreign state itself.169 However, several international law expert groups and commentators have advanced proposals to disaggregate conduct immunity from state attribution in
the case of jus cogens violations.170 Such proposals would enable
167
See ILC Secretariat Memorandum at 116, ¶¶ 180–83 (reviewing authorities) (cited
in note 106).
168
See id at 102, ¶ 156 (“[T]here appear to be strong reasons for aligning the immunity
regime with the rules on attribution of conduct for purposes of State responsibility.”); id
at 105, ¶ 160 (“If unlawful or criminal acts were considered, as a matter of principle, to
be ‘non-ofﬁcial’ for purposes of immunity ratione materiae, the very notion of ‘immunity’
would be deprived of much of its content.”); International Law Commission, Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries Art 7, cmt 8
(2001) (“Articles on States’ Responsibility”) (acts of a state ofﬁcial or organ in excess of
authority or in contravention of instructions is nonetheless attributable to the state provided that the organ or ofﬁcial was “purportedly or apparently carrying out ofﬁcial functions”), online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/
9_6_2001.pdf; id at Art 4, cmt 13 (“[T]o determine whether a person who is a State organ
acts in that capacity . . . [i]t is irrelevant . . . that the person concerned may . . . be abusing
public power.”). But see id at Art 7, cmt 8 (distinguishing “between unauthorized but still
‘ofﬁcial’ conduct, on the one hand, and ‘private’ conduct on the other,” and indicating
that “isolated instances of outrageous conduct on the part of persons who are ofﬁcials”
should be treated as private conduct not attributable to the state).
169
See Ferrini, Oxford Rep Intl L in Dom Cts at ¶ 11; Jones, 129 Intl L Rep at 744,
¶ 84 (Lord Hoffman); id at 723–24, ¶ 19 (Lord Bingham); see also Articles on States’
Responsibility at Art 4, cmt 13 (cited in note 168) (“Where [a government ofﬁcial] acts in
an apparently ofﬁcial capacity, or under colour of authority, the actions in question will
be attributable to the State.”). To be sure, the Draft Articles are “without prejudice to
any question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting
on behalf of a State.” Id at Art 58. The commentary makes clear, however, that “[s]o far
this principle has operated in the ﬁeld of [individual] criminal responsibility,” although
“it is not excluded that developments may occur in the ﬁeld of individual civil responsibility.”
Id at Art 58, cmt 2 (emphasis added). The commentary also reiterates that “[w]here crimes
against international law are committed by State ofﬁcials, it will often be the case that
the State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or punish
them.” Id at Art 58, cmt 3.
170
See, for example, Hazel Fox, Imputability and Immunity as Separate Concepts: The
Removal of Immunity from Civil Proceedings Relating to the Commission of an International
Crime, in Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad and Michael Bohlander, eds, International Law and Power:
Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice 165 (Brill, 2009).
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domestic courts to assert both criminal and civil jurisdiction over
former ofﬁcials alleged to have committed such violations without,
at the same time, implicating the responsibility of the foreign state
itself.171
Two additional considerations are also relevant. First, the UN
Immunities Convention, discussed above, does not contain an exception to immunity for civil suits alleging violations of jus cogens.
In fact, the Convention’s drafters twice rejected proposals to adopt
such an exception, both because there was no settled state practice
to support it and because “any attempt to include such a provision
would almost certainly have jeopardized the conclusion of the Convention.”172 As a result, even commentators critical of this omission
concede that “state ofﬁcials and other state agents may beneﬁt from
the immunity of the state afforded by the Convention, even with
respect to civil suits seeking to recover pecuniary compensation for
crimes under international law.”173 This conclusion is reinforced by
declarations that Norway and Sweden ﬁled when ratifying the Convention in 2006 and 2009, respectively, which assert that the Convention is “without prejudice to any future international legal development concerning the protection of human rights.”174
A second consideration relates to the persuasiveness of distinguishing between civil and criminal cases. If jus cogens are higherorder legal norms, they should arguably negate immunity “in relation to any legal liability whatsoever,” whether civil or criminal.175
171
See, for example, Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunities of States and Their Ofﬁcials
in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law (Oxford, 2008); Fox,
The Law of State Immunity at 699–700, 750 (cited in note 83) (reviewing a proposal by
the Institut de Droit International); Donald Francis Donovan and Anthea Roberts, The
Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 Am J Intl L 142 (2006); Stacy
Humes-Schulz, Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of Human Rights, 21 Harv Hum
Rts J 105 (2008).
172
Hall, 55 Intl & Comp L Q at 412 & n 5 (internal quotations omitted) (cited in note
114).
173
Id at 416; see also Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 Intl & Comp
L Q 437, 438 (2006).
174
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, Declarations of Norway and Sweden (emphasis added), online at http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?srcpTREATY&mtdsg_nopIII-13&chapterp3&langpen; see also id,
Declaration of Switzerland (asserting that the Convention “is without prejudice to developments in international law” regarding “pecuniary compensation for serious human
rights violations which are alleged to be attributable to a State”).
175
See, for example, Al-Adsani, App No 35763/97 at 34 (Grand Chamber) (Loucaides
dissenting); see also Fox, Imputability and Immunity at 167 (proposing “an extension of the
removal of functional immunity to civil proceedings in respect of the commission of . . .
an international crime”) (cited in note 170).
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One might also argue that immunity should be determined by the
nature of the underlying acts rather than the type of proceeding
involved.176 This claim is supported by the fact that many civil law
countries allow victims to recover damages as part of a criminal
proceeding.177 Lastly, abrogating the immunity ratione materiae of
foreign ofﬁcials in criminal cases may result in a conviction that
deprives the ofﬁcial of his or her liberty for many years. In civil
suits, by contrast, lifting immunity may result in an award of monetary damages against the ofﬁcial that, in some instances, may be
paid or reimbursed by the foreign state. If immunity is abrogated
in criminal proceedings where the penalties are greater, it might
seem to follow a fortiori that it should also be disregarded in civil
suits.
There are a number of potential responses to these arguments.
First, the abrogation of immunity in criminal proceedings has a
long pedigree, one that dates back at least to the Nuremberg trials
of Nazi ofﬁcials after World War II and that is more recently reﬂected in multilateral conventions that impose a duty on states
parties to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over the alleged
perpetrators of jus cogens violations, and in international criminal
tribunals whose statutes expressly override the immunity of government ofﬁcials charged with those violations.178 Second, domestic
criminal proceedings are subject to screening mechanisms and procedural safeguards that do not exist in civil suits, most notably review
by public prosecutors or government agencies that are authorized
176
See, for example, Humes-Schulz, 21 Harv Hum Rts J at 118–19 (cited in note 171);
McGregor, 55 Intl & Comp L Q at 444 (cited in note 173).
177
See, for example, Written Comments by Redress et al at 6 (cited in note 138). See
also Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 22 Yale J Intl L 1, 19 (2002)
(noting that “[m]any civil law systems permit civil claims to be ﬁled as an adjunct to a
criminal prosecution”).
178
See, for example, Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure at 531–60 (cited in note 119); William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The
Crimes of Crimes 316–24 (2000). The General Assembly adopted the UN Immunities
Convention with the understanding that it did not apply to criminal proceedings “out of
concern that the availability of immunity in [such] proceedings would conﬂict with the
duty to prosecute certain crimes under international law.” McGregor, 55 Intl & Comp L
Q at 444 (cited in note 173). The trend toward accountability and monetary reparations
in civil cases is more recent and less well developed. See, for example, Dinah Shelton,
Remedies in International Human Rights Law 10–12, 291–353 (Oxford, 2d ed 2006); UN
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, Resolution 60/147, UN General Assembly, 60th Sess (Mar
21, 2005), UN Doc A/Res/60/147.
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to dismiss complaints on various grounds.179 Third and relatedly,
the permissive approach to civil litigation in the United States—
including broad personal jurisdiction rules, contingent attorneys’
fees, expansive discovery, and punitive damages—is controversial in
many other countries, whereas the exercise of U.S. criminal jurisdiction is much less so.180

***
The foregoing overview reveals that, although CIL traditionally
conferred immunity on foreign ofﬁcials for actions taken on behalf
of their state, this immunity has eroded over the past decade, although primarily in the criminal rather than civil context. It is
difﬁcult, however, to reach ﬁrm conclusions about the current state
of the CIL of foreign ofﬁcial immunity because the law in this area
is unsettled and rapidly evolving. This has implications for whether
and how U.S. courts apply CIL in shaping the common law of
foreign ofﬁcial immunity after Samantar, a subject we address below.
Before turning to this issue, we ﬁrst bracket the ongoing debate
among scholars of U.S. foreign relations law over the proper relationship between CIL and federal common law. There are three
basic positions in this debate. One position is that, at least in the
absence of a directive by Congress to the contrary, CIL automatically has the status of federal common law.181 At the other end of
the spectrum is the view that CIL should never operate as federal
law unless and until it is afﬁrmatively incorporated as such by the
political branches.182 An intermediate position (of which there are
179
The universal jurisdiction statutes in Spain and Belgium were amended to incorporate
such procedural safeguards, and a similar proposal is pending in the United Kingdom.
See citations in note 136.
180
See, for example, Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty: U.S. Litigation in the Mirror
of International Law, 52 DePaul L Rev 627 (2002).
181
See, for example, Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82
Mich L Rev 1555, 1561 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?
111 Harv L Rev 1824, 1835 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev 371,
373 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal
Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L Rev 393, 397 (1997).
182
It is not clear whether there are currently any academic proponents of this view,
although it is possible to read some critiques of CIL as having this implication. See, for
example, John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?
59 Stan L Rev 1175 (2007), and J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 Va J Intl L 449 (2000); see also Al-Bihani v Obama, 619 F3d 1, 16 (DC Cir 2010)
(Kavanaugh concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[I]nternational-law principles
found in non-self-executing treaties and customary international law, but not incorporated
into statutes or self-executing treaties, are not part of domestic U.S. law.”).

6]

SAMANTAR V YOUSUF

249

many variants) is that CIL can inform federal common law in select
instances, but only if it is applied interstitially in a manner consistent
with the policy choices made by the political branches.183
Although one of us has written extensively on the topic, we do
not take a position here on which of these views is correct. For
present purposes, it is sufﬁcient to note two points. First, CIL is
potentially relevant to the post-Samantar common law of immunity
under each of these three views, since even those who contend that
CIL should not be applied absent incorporation by the political
branches might accept that statutes such as the ATS or TVPA have
incorporated principles of CIL or have delegated to courts some
authority to incorporate them. Second, one of the paradigmatic
cases cited by proponents of the view that CIL applies automatically
as federal common law is the issue of foreign ofﬁcial immunity,184
and even skeptics of that view have acknowledged that CIL may be
relevant to judicial development of this area of law.185
III. International Law and the Post-Samantar Common
Law of Immunity
In this part, we consider the potential relevance of the international law discussed in the last part to the post-Samantar common law of foreign ofﬁcial immunity. Our goal here is to frame
the possible judicial choices in this area rather than argue for a
particular approach. As we will explain, CIL’s relevance is likely to
183
See, for example, Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore, 120 Harv L Rev at 904–05 (cited
in note 100); see also Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the
Incorporation of International Law, 111 Harv L Rev 2260, 2270 (1998) (“When the political
branches cannot plausibly be viewed as having authorized the incorporation of CIL, and
especially when they have explicitly precluded incorporation, federal courts cannot legitimately federalize CIL.”). For somewhat similar views, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum L Rev 1, 76–90 (2009)
(arguing that, although CIL is not automatically part of federal common law, courts should
apply some rules derived from CIL as a means of implementing the Constitution’s assignments of authority to the federal political branches), and Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary
International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 Va J Intl L 513, 536, 550
(2002) (arguing that federal courts have some authority to develop federal common law
“interstitially in the area of foreign affairs to serve important federal interests,” while also
noting that such federal common law “should take its cue from congressional enactments”).
184
See, for example, Koh, 111 Harv L Rev at 1829 (discussing head-of-state immunity)
(cited in note 181); Neuman, 66 Fordham L Rev at 382–83 (discussing consular immunity)
(cited in note 181).
185
See Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev at 90 (cited in note 183); Bradley and
Goldsmith, 111 Harv L Rev at 2270 (cited in note 183); Bradley, Goldsmith, and Moore,
120 Harv L Rev at 922–24 (cited in note 100).
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depend in part on institutional considerations relating to the proper
role of U.S. courts in the area of foreign affairs, the authority of
the Executive Branch to affect pending litigation, and the congressional policies reﬂected in existing statutes.
a. customary international law
For several reasons, we believe that courts will take account of
CIL when developing the post-Samantar common law of foreign
ofﬁcial immunity. As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court has
recognized that sovereign immunity is governed by principles of
international law and that the FSIA codiﬁed some of those principles.186 The Court’s conclusion in Samantar that the statute codiﬁed only principles relating to suits against foreign states and not
those against foreign ofﬁcials does not suggest that the Court
believed that international law was irrelevant to the latter suits.
Indeed, in rejecting the assertion that its interpretation of the FSIA
might create a conﬂict with international law, the Court did not
deny CIL’s relevance, but rather noted that common law immunity
could protect against a breach of international law.187
The Court has also looked to international law for guidance in
other related contexts. A good example is First National City Bank
v Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba.188 In that case, a Cuban
government-owned instrumentality sued to recover on a letter of
credit, and the issue was whether the defendant could assert a
counterclaim against the instrumentality for the value of assets
that the Cuban government had expropriated. In allowing the
counterclaim (and thus piercing the veil between the instrumentality and the state), the Court applied principles “common to
both international law and federal common law, which in these
circumstances is necessarily informed both by international law
principles and by articulated congressional policies.”189 As part of
its analysis, the Court considered the history and purposes of the
186
See, for example, Permanent Mission of India, 551 US at 200 (considering “international practice at the time of the FSIA’s enactment” when construing an ambiguity in the
statute).
187
188
189

See Samantar, 130 S Ct at 2290 n 14.
462 US 611 (1983).
Id at 623.
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FSIA, judicial decisions from the United States and other countries, and general principles of equity.190
Assuming that international law is relevant, there are a number
of ways that U.S. courts could interpret and apply CIL immunity
rules when developing the common law. We begin with the easiest
case: sitting heads of state. With regard to ATS and TVPA suits
against these national leaders, we foresee at least three reasons
that federal courts will follow the ICJ’s Arrest Warrant judgment
and interpret CIL to require dismissal on status immunity
grounds.191 First, as Part II reveals, the immunity ratione personae
of ofﬁcials that international law recognizes as “heads of state”—
presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, and foreign ministers—has
become more rather than less entrenched over the last decade.
Second, actions against serving heads of state are the closest that
litigants can come to suing the foreign state itself. Such suits thus
raise serious foreign relations concerns that weigh heavily against
adjudication. Finally, interpreting CIL as mandating status immunity is consistent with pre-Samantar decisions that dismissed
suits alleging even jus cogens violations by heads of state.192
With regard to the immunity ratione materiae of lower-level
ofﬁcials and all ofﬁcials no longer in ofﬁce, the key issue that U.S.
courts will face is whether CIL includes a jus cogens exception to
conduct immunity. As discussed in Part II, a growing number of
national and international courts recognize such an exception in
criminal proceedings against former ofﬁcials who served at all
levels of government. In civil suits for damages, by contrast, there
has been less recognition of such an exception. Below, we identify
a number of competing legal and policy considerations that U.S.
190
Although more controversial, a majority of the Court has even looked to international
law when interpreting certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution that have an exclusively
domestic application. See, for example, Graham v Florida, 130 S Ct 2011, 2033–34 (2010);
Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 575–78 (2005). A fortiori, the Court is likely to view CIL
as germane to developing common law doctrines that are closely related to foreign affairs,
such as the common law governing foreign ofﬁcial immunity.
191
A potential exception would be where the Executive suggests nonimmunity, an issue
we discuss in Section B below.
192
See Ye v Zemin, 383 F3d 620, 624–30 (7th Cir 2004); Lafontant v Aristide, 844 F
Supp 128, 131–39 (EDNY 1994) (recognizing head-of-state immunity of exiled Haitian
President in suit under TVPA alleging extrajudicial killing); Tachiona v Mugabe, 169 F
Supp 2d 259, 294–97 (SDNY 2001) (recognizing head-of-state immunity of President of
Zimbabwe in a suit alleging numerous human rights violations), aff ’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 386 F3d 205 (2d Cir 2004).
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courts should take account of when addressing this question of
CIL.
We begin with a general point about the relationship between
immunity and human rights. As we explained in Part II, the erosion
of conduct immunity during the decade since the House of Lords’
Pinochet decision represents a striking shift from the traditional
approach to the CIL immunity of foreign ofﬁcials. This erosion
serves an important international interest—expanding domestic
accountability mechanisms for individuals responsible for human
rights abuses. To date, however, these accountability mechanisms
are mandatory only where states have a treaty- or CIL-based obligation to extradite or criminally prosecute the perpetrators of
jus cogens violations. In civil suits relating to those same violations,
by contrast, efforts to promote accountability outside a government ofﬁcial’s home country must be consistent with CIL immunity rules.193 Stated differently, the recent narrowing of conduct
immunity has not (or at least not yet) created a concomitant CIL
obligation that requires national courts to exercise jurisdiction in
civil cases.194
This fact has important implications for which approach U.S.
courts follow. A court that interprets immunity broadly will not
violate CIL, whereas a court that interprets immunity narrowly
may. To avoid the risk of foreign relations frictions and accusations
that the United States is disregarding international law, U.S. courts
may decide to follow the reasoning of their colleagues in Australia,
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and hold that CIL presumptively shields former government ofﬁcials from suits alleging
human rights violations.
The arguments in favor of adopting this approach to conduct
193
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has emphasized this
point, reasoning that the rights protected in the European Convention—including the jus
cogens ban on torture—must be interpreted “in harmony with other rules of international
law . . . , including those relating to the grant of State immunity.” Al-Adsani, App No
35763/97 at 16, ¶ 55; see also Kalogeropoulou v Greece and Germany, App No 59021/00
(Eur Ct Hum Rts 2002) (inadmissibility decision) (unreported) (rejecting the petitioners’
argument that “international law on crimes against humanity was so fundamental that it
amounted to a rule of jus cogens that took precedence over all other principles of international law, including the principle of sovereign immunity”).
194
The hierarchy argument adopted by the Italian Court of Cassation in Ferrini arguably
imposes an obligation to assert jurisdiction in civil cases. Although such an obligation has
been endorsed by a number of commentators, see, for example, Orakhelashvili, 18 Eur J
Intl L at 967 (cited in note 150), it has received little support in state practice or the
decisions of domestic and international courts.
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immunity are especially strong where a foreign state asserts either
that the ofﬁcial’s actions were carried out on its behalf or that it
is willing to assume responsibility for his or her conduct. In both
instances, dismissal can be seen as furthering the policy rationale
of aligning CIL immunity principles with the international law of
state responsibility.195 As the ICJ indicated in Djibouti v France,196
a case involving the immunity ratione materiae of two Djiboutian
ofﬁcials, a “State notifying a foreign court that judicial process
should not proceed, for reasons of immunity, against its State
organs, is assuming responsibility for any internationally wrongful
act in issue committed by such organs.”197
Interpreting CIL to require conduct immunity for foreign ofﬁcials in civil cases would not completely bar ATS or TVPA suits
against such ofﬁcials. A court adopting this approach could continue to assert jurisdiction over ATS and TVPA complaints against
foreign ofﬁcials in at least two instances: ﬁrst, where the foreign
state waives immunity;198 and second, where the foreign state indicates that the defendant’s actions were unauthorized or not
within the scope of his or her authority.199 As discussed below in
Section B, it is also possible that the Executive Branch may have
some case-speciﬁc authority to override an ofﬁcial’s immunity even
where CIL recognizes it.
Nevertheless, the recognition of CIL conduct immunity for foreign ofﬁcials is in tension with the approach that U.S. courts
195

See discussion and authorities in notes 168–69 and accompanying text.

196

Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v
France) (merits), 2008 ICJ 177.
197
198

Id at 244, ¶ 196.

Where a state has recently undergone a regime change, for example, the new government may favor human rights litigation in the United States against its former ofﬁcials.
See, for example, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F2d 1108, 1110–11 (4th Cir 1987)
(giving effect to the Philippine government’s waiver of head-of-state immunity claimed
by the former President and his wife).
199
Prior to Samantar, courts gave considerable weight to the views of foreign governments on these issues. See, for example, Belhas v Ya’alon, 515 F3d 1279, 1283 (DC Cir
2008) (“In cases involving foreign sovereign immunity, it is also appropriate to look to
statements of the foreign state that either authorize or ratify the acts at issue to determine
whether the defendant committed the alleged acts in an ofﬁcial capacity.”); Hilao v Estate
of Marcos, 25 F3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir 1994) (citing a letter from the Philippine government
urging the court to exercise jurisdiction over its former President for “acts of torture,
execution, and disappearance [that] were clearly acts outside of his authority”); see also
Kline v Kaneko, 685 F Supp 386, 389–90 (SDNY 1988) (deferring to submission of Mexican
government that defendant was acting “within the scope of his ofﬁcial duties” for purposes
of the FSIA).

254

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2010

followed during the thirty years between Filartiga and Samantar.
During that period, most courts held that suits against former
government ofﬁcials were covered by the FSIA. Courts also concluded, however, that jus cogens violations were not ofﬁcial acts
and, as a result, that the individuals who committed such violations
were not entitled to immunity.200 In the wake of the Court’s holding in Samantar that federal common law now controls these issues, a judge that endorses the pro-immunity view may, in effect,
be conceding that many of the cases decided during those three
decades were in violation of CIL. Indeed, the House of Lords in
Jones suggested precisely this conclusion, as did the separate opinion in the Arrest Warrant Case, albeit using more diplomatic language.201
In light of the division in foreign court decisions, and the lower
court precedents that have built up since Filartiga, U.S. courts
could plausibly hold that conduct immunity is unavailable to foreign ofﬁcials in civil suits alleging jus cogens violations. This approach would advance important international interests that are
in tension with immunity, such as expanding domestic accountability mechanisms for jus cogens violations and providing damage
remedies to victims.202 The U.S. political branches have expressed
support for these interests, albeit not always consistently, during
the three decades of domestic human rights litigation since Filartiga.203
In choosing between these positions, U.S. courts will need to
200
201

See citations in note 59.

Jones, 129 Intl L Rep at 724 –25, ¶20 (Lord Bingham) (describing the TVPA as not
“express[ing] principles widely shared and observed among other nations”); id at 737, ¶
58 (Lord Hoffman) (labeling the TVPA as “not required and perhaps not permitted by
customary international law”); Arrest Warrant Case ( Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal), 2002 ICJ at 77, ¶ 48 (characterizing the ATS as a “unilateral
exercise of the function of guardian of international values [that] has not attracted the
approbation of States generally”).
202
See, for example, Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law at 10 –12, 291–
353 (cited in note 178); UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (cited in note 178).
203
For example, the Carter administration submitted an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiffs in Filartiga, and the Clinton administration submitted an amicus brief in support
of the plaintiffs in Kadic v Karadz̄ić, 70 F3d 232 (2d Cir 1995). In addition, Congress in
1992 enacted the TVPA, which was signed by the ﬁrst President Bush (although he articulated some concerns about the statute in a signing statement). Both the Reagan administration and the second Bush administration, however, argued for curtailing ATS
litigation.
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take account of the fact that CIL immunity rules are unsettled.
The leading national exemplars of the two contending approaches
have both been challenged before international courts. As noted
in Part II, the ECHR is considering whether the British House
of Lords’ decision in Jones is contrary to the European Convention, and the ICJ is reviewing Germany’s challenge to the Ferrini
line of cases from Italy. At least until the ECHR and ICJ have
issued their judgments in these cases, the international law of
foreign ofﬁcial immunity will remain in ﬂux.
This uncertainty raises difﬁcult issues concerning the institutional competence of U.S. courts to interpret and apply CIL. On
the one hand, the unsettled content of international law provides
a unique opportunity for federal judges to participate in the global
judicial dialogue over the proper balance between immunity and
accountability and shape CIL’s future trajectory.204 But this uncertainty also suggests that U.S. courts should exercise caution
before advancing an interpretation of CIL that may offend foreign
governments or create foreign relations difﬁculties for the Executive.
The Supreme Court sounded a similar note of caution in what
is arguably the leading decision concerning the role of federal
common law in the area of foreign affairs, Banco Nacional de Cuba
v Sabbatino.205 In that case, the Cuban government attempted to
recover proceeds from the sale of a shipment of sugar and the
issue was whether it should be barred from recovery because it
had violated CIL in expropriating the sugar factory. In holding
that the expropriation did not bar recovery, the Court relied on
the act of state doctrine, pursuant to which U.S. courts will not
204
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U
Richmond L Rev 99 (1994). Many of the foreign and international court decisions cited
in Part II refer to U.S. statutes and judicial decisions when canvasing state practice regarding the immunity of foreign ofﬁcials, sometimes characterizing the same evidence in
conﬂicting ways. Compare Ferrini, Oxford Rep Intl L in Dom Cts at ¶ 10.2 (interpreting
1996 amendment to FSIA authorizing certain suits against foreign states designated as
sponsors of terrorism as evidence of “the priority importance that is now attributed to
the protection of basic human rights over the interests of the State in securing recognition
for its own immunity from foreign jurisdiction”), with Al-Adsani, App No 35763/97 at
19, ¶ 64 (interpreting the same amendment as “conﬁrm[ing] that the general rule of
international law remain[s] that immunity attache[s] even in respect of claims of acts of
ofﬁcial torture” in civil suits for damages). By participating in the global judicial dialogue
on CIL immunity issues, U.S. courts could help to resolve these differences and clarify
the implications of recent developments in the United States.
205
376 US 398 (1964).
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question the validity of the acts of foreign governments taken
within their own territory, a doctrine that the Court made clear
had the status of federal common law.206
In applying the act of state doctrine even in the face of an alleged
violation of CIL, the Court reasoned that the propriety of federal
judicial involvement in interpreting and applying CIL was directly
proportional to how widely accepted it was,207 and it concluded
that “[t]here are few if any issues in international law today on
which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s
power to expropriate the property of aliens.”208 The Court also
characterized as “quite unpersuasive” the countervailing argument
in favor of judicial review—that “United States courts could make
a signiﬁcant contribution to the growth of international law.”209
At the same time, the Court made clear that it was “in no way
intimat[ing] that the courts of this country are broadly foreclosed
from considering questions of international law” in “areas . . . in
which consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a battleground for conﬂicting ideologies.”210
Although there are similarities between the expropriation issues
in Sabbatino and the immunity issues in ATS and TVPA suits
against foreign ofﬁcials, there are also important differences. First,
U.S. courts have been contributing, albeit indirectly, to the erosion
of CIL immunity principles for more than three decades. Second,
all states, or nearly all, are participants in the international human
rights system and have recognized, via treaty ratiﬁcations and state
practice, the importance of abrogating ofﬁcial immunity for jus
cogens violations in at least some contexts. The divisions in CIL
are thus less “a battleground for conﬂicting ideologies” than a
debate over how to strike a proper balance between two widely
shared international values. Third, the U.S. political branches (as
well as the Supreme Court) have sanctioned at least some forms
of judicial interpretation and application of CIL in litigation under
the ATS and TVPA. Taken together, these distinguishing factors
206

See id at 432–33.

207

Id at 428 (explaining that “the greater the degree of codiﬁcation or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary
to render decisions regarding it”).
208
209
210

Id.
Sabatino, 376 US at 434.
Id at 430 n 34.
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suggest that Sabbatino is not a categorical bar to a more assertive
judicial role in the development of CIL immunity principles. Finally, a key consideration in Sabbatino was the need to protect the
institutional prerogatives of the Executive Branch, an issue to
which we now turn.
b. role of the executive
There are a number of reasons to believe that the views of the
Executive Branch will be relevant to the development and application of the post-Samantar common law of immunity. As discussed above, courts gave absolute deference to Executive suggestions of immunity and non-immunity prior to the enactment
of the FSIA in 1976.211 Since that time, courts have continued to
defer to Executive suggestions of immunity for heads of state—
including in suits alleging violations of jus cogens.212 Furthermore,
in Samantar, the Supreme Court observed that it had “been given
no reason to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted
to eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual ofﬁcial immunity.”213 It is also arguable that the
Executive’s interpretation of CIL is entitled to some deference,
just as it is with respect to treaty interpretations,214 in which case
its views regarding the scope of the CIL of foreign ofﬁcial immunity would likely be inﬂuential. Finally, in the context of both
the FSIA and the ATS, the Supreme Court has suggested (albeit
cryptically) that the Executive’s views concerning whether particular cases should proceed might be a relevant consideration for
the courts.215
There are, to be sure, countervailing considerations. Courts
have addressed the immunity of foreign ofﬁcials (other than heads
211

See text accompanying notes 20 –28.

212

See citations in note 57.

213

130 S Ct at 2291 (footnote omitted).

214

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 112, cmt c (“Courts give particular weight to the positions taken by the United States Government on questions of
international law because it is deemed desirable that so far as possible the United States
speak with one voice on such matters. The views of the United States Government,
moreover, are also state practice, creating or modifying [customary] international law.”)
(cited in note 4); consider also Medellı́n v Texas, 552 US 491, 513 (2008) (“It is . . . well
settled that the United States’ interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled to great weight.’”),
quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v Avagliano, 457 US 176, 184 –85 (1982).
215
See Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 US 677, 702 (2004) (FSIA); Sosa v AlvarezMachain, 542 US 692, 733 n 21 (2004) (ATS).
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of state) for over thirty years without deferring to the Executive.
Moreover, as discussed above, one of the principal reasons for the
FSIA’s enactment was to shift immunity determinations away from
the Executive Branch.216 Furthermore, the constitutional rationale
for the pre-FSIA deference regime is under-theorized and thus
may be open to challenge. The Constitution assigns to the President the authority to receive foreign ambassadors, and the Supreme Court has plausibly interpreted this authority to include
the power to determine which governments and heads of state
should be recognized by the United States.217 It is not clear, however, why that recognition power encompasses a power to decide
whether particular ofﬁcials of a recognized government are entitled to immunity, which turns on questions of law rather than
status. For a sitting head of state, an Executive recognition might
in effect determine immunity, assuming CIL gives absolute immunity to sitting heads of state (as it probably does). But for other
ofﬁcials as well as all former ofﬁcials, immunity does not automatically follow from recognition.
As for the implications of Samantar, although the Court referred
to the pre-FSIA deference regime, it also repeatedly suggested
that foreign ofﬁcial immunity is governed by the common law,
and it did not direct the courts on remand to solicit or consider
the Executive Branch’s views in determining the content of the
common law. Moreover, in a closely analogous context—judicial
development of the common law governing the act of state doctrine—the Supreme Court has declined to treat as dispositive the
Executive’s views concerning the contours of that law,218 and a
majority of Justices have also balked at the idea of giving absolute
deference to the Executive in the case-speciﬁc applications of the
doctrine.219
After Samantar, the question of whether federal courts should
defer to the Executive’s views regarding immunity will be a key
point of contention in many ATS and TVPA suits. In particular,
216

See text accompanying note 38.

217

See Sabbatino, 376 US at 410.

218

See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v Environmental Tectonics Corp., Intl., 493 US 400,
408 & n * (1990) (rejecting the Executive Branch’s proposed multifactored approach to
the act of state doctrine).
219
See First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 US 759 (1972), in which
six Justices rejected the “Bernstein exception” to the act of state doctrine that would have
allowed the Executive Branch to turn the doctrine off on a case-by-case basis.
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the Court’s conclusion that the FSIA does not apply to individuals
may lead the State Department to reconsider its prior practice as
to when it suggests immunity in suits against foreign ofﬁcials.220
The Executive Branch had previously expressed the view that foreign ofﬁcials were protected by immunity for acts taken on behalf
of their state and that “customary international law does not recognize any jus cogens exception to foreign ofﬁcial immunity.”221
That view was expressed during the Bush administration, however,
and it is possible that the current administration or future administrations will adopt a different position.
At a minimum, foreign governments are likely to pressure the
State Department to suggest immunity in a nontrivial number of
cases, much as they did in the years prior to the FSIA’s adoption.
Conversely, U.S. human rights advocates may urge the department
to intervene on behalf of plaintiffs by indicating that immunity
would not be appropriate.222 This raises the question of what process the department should employ in deciding how to respond
to these competing pressures.
There are several ways in which the Executive Branch might
express its views regarding the common law of foreign ofﬁcial
immunity. First, the State Department might suggest immunity
in individual cases, just as it did before the FSIA’s enactment. Such
suggestions are likely to reﬂect the foreign policy interests of the
United States and thus may not track perfectly the contours of
CIL. Nevertheless, because international law does not require that
U.S. courts hear civil suits against foreign ofﬁcials, such suggestions pose little risk of placing the United States in breach of CIL.
220
The State Department “has a longstanding practice of afﬁrmatively ‘suggesting’ headof-state immunity to our courts when a person who enjoys the immunity has been served
with judicial process.” John Bellinger, Immunities (Opinio Juris, Jan 18, 2007), online at
http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/18/immunities/. Less frequently, the department has expressed a position on the immunity of other foreign ofﬁcials. See, for example, Statement
of Interest of the United States of America, Matar v Dichter, 05 Civ 10270 (WHP) (SDNY,
ﬁled Nov 17, 2006), online at http://ccrjustice.org/ﬁles/StatementofInterestDichter
11.17.06.pdf. As a procedural matter, “suggestions of immunity normally respond to requests from a foreign government made after its ofﬁcial has been served with a complaint
in a civil action. [The Department] usually asks that the request be conveyed through a
diplomatic note, with all relevant information and documents . . . .” Bellinger, Immunities
(cited in this note).
221
United States Matar Brief at *22 (citation omitted) (cited in note 15).
222
See John B. Bellinger III, Ruling Burdens State Dept., Natl L J ( June 28, 2010), in
which the former State Department Legal Adviser predicts that, as a result of Samantar,
the department “will be subject in the future to intensive lobbying by both plaintiffs and
defendants.”
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At worst, if courts defer to these suggestions, the United States
might provide more immunity than international law requires.
The decision whether to defer to such suggestions, therefore, will
primarily be informed by domestic separation of powers considerations, even for courts that might otherwise conclude that CIL
conduct immunity does not protect foreign ofﬁcials from civil suits
alleging violations of jus cogens.
Second, the State Department might make suggestions of nonimmunity in particular cases. Since the enactment of the FSIA,
the Executive Branch has not made such suggestions, although in
two cases courts relied on what they perceived as de facto Executive opposition to immunity.223 Suggestions of non-immunity
pose a greater risk of conﬂict with international law than suggestions of immunity, since, as discussed above in Part II, CIL can
still reasonably be interpreted as providing ofﬁcials with conduct
immunity from civil suits in foreign courts, even for alleged jus
cogens violations. The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that
CIL should not be applied by U.S. courts in the face of a “controlling executive or legislative act” to the contrary.224 Even putting
to one side whether a suggestion of non-immunity qualiﬁes as
such an act, if the Executive Branch argues that CIL does not
require immunity in a particular situation, courts are likely to give
that view some weight, as noted above. So, once again, the issue
of deference to these suggestions is likely to turn more on domestic
rather than international law considerations.225
223
See United States v Noriega, 117 F3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir 1997) (rejecting claim of
head-of-state immunity in part because the government’s decision to prosecute constituted
implicit rejection of immunity); Kadic v Karadz̄ić, 70 F3d 232, 248–50 (2d Cir 1995)
(rejecting head-of-state immunity in part because the State Department had ﬁled a Statement of Interest in favor of allowing the plaintiffs’ ATS claims to proceed).
224
See The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900); see also, for example, Gisbert v
U.S. Attorney General, 988 F2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir 1993).
225
On remand in Samantar, the Department of Justice ﬁled a Statement of Interest with
the district court explaining that “[u]pon consideration of the facts and circumstances of
this case, as well as the applicable principles of customary international law, the Department
of State has determined that Defendant enjoys no claim of ofﬁcial immunity from this
civil suit.” “Particularly signiﬁcant among the circumstances of this case and critical to
the present Statement of Interest,” the Justice Department further stated, “are (1) that
Samantar is a former ofﬁcial of a state with no currently recognized government to request
immunity on his behalf, including by expressing a position on whether the acts in question
were taken in an ofﬁcial capacity, and (2) the Executive’s assessment that it is appropriate
in the circumstances here to give effect to the proposition that U.S. residents like Samantar
who enjoy the protections of U.S. law ordinarily should be subject to the jurisdiction of
our courts, particularly when sued by U.S. residents.” Finally, the statement asserted that
“[b]ecause the Executive Branch is taking an express position in this case, the Court should
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A third way that the Executive Branch might express its view
would be through a document akin to the Tate Letter. Such a
document would likely describe a variety of factors that the State
Department considers relevant to determinations of immunity. Indications of what such a document might contain are found in the
government’s amicus brief in Samantar. Emphasizing the “complexities that could attend the immunity determination in this and
other cases,” the brief explained that “the Executive might ﬁnd it
appropriate to take into account [1] issues of reciprocity, [2] customary international law and state practice, [3] the immunity of
the state itself, and, when appropriate, [4] domestic precedents.”226
Additional considerations mentioned in the brief include [5] “the
nature of the acts alleged—and [6] whether they should properly
be regarded as actions in an ofﬁcial capacity,” [7] whether the
United States has recognized the foreign government at issue, [8]
“the foreign state’s position on whether the alleged conduct was
in an ofﬁcial capacity,” [9] whether the foreign state has “waive[d]
the immunity of a current or former ofﬁcial,” [10] whether the
suit “relie[s] on the ATS to assert a federal common law cause of
action” or “the statutory right of action in the TVPA,” [11]
whether one or more plaintiffs or defendants reside in the United
States, [12] “ﬁdelity to international norms,” and [13] the consequences of immunity or non-immunity for “the protection of
United States ofﬁcials abroad.”227
By itself, a list of such numerous and diverse factors is unlikely
to provide much guidance to courts attempting to decide whether
to recognize immunity in particular ATS or TVPA cases. As Judge
Easterbrook remarked in a somewhat different context, such a list
does little more than “call[] on the district judge to throw a heap
of factors on a table and then slice and dice to taste.”228 If the
letter were to closely track the government’s brief in Samantar, it
would likely leave considerable freedom to courts to apply the
accept and defer to the determination that Defendant is not immune from suit.” Statement
of Interest, Yousuf v Samantar at 6 –7 (cited in note 15).
226
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Afﬁrmance, Samantar v
Yousuf, No 08-1555, *24 –*25 (ﬁled Jan 27, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL
342031) (enumeration added).
227
Id at *25–*27 (enumeration added).
228
Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc. v Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F2d 1275,
1283–284 (7th Cir 1990) (Easterbrook concurring) (criticizing the creation of a federal
common law of privileges based on the indeterminate multifactor balancing test in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law).
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CIL principles discussed in Part II above or the domestic statutory
policies reviewed in Section C below.229
The State Department may, however, attempt to distill these
factors into a more coherent set of legal and policy guidelines that
explain the types of suits, claims, and contexts in which recognition
of immunity for foreign ofﬁcials would or would not be appropriate. For example, the department might identify speciﬁc situations in which immunity would be recognized or abrogated, presumptions that could be rebutted by particular factual showings,
and inferences courts should draw from the department’s failure
to express a position. Immunity ratione personae for sitting heads
of state and foreign ministers (and perhaps for other high-level
ofﬁcials), and non-immunity for ofﬁcials whose immunity has been
waived by a foreign government that the United States has recognized, are two obvious candidates for categorical rules. A presumption against conduct immunity might apply to suits against
former ofﬁcials for alleged torture or extrajudicial killing, unless
the foreign state indicates that the ofﬁcials were acting in the scope
of their authority or otherwise agrees to accept responsibility for
the ofﬁcials’ acts.230 Such a presumption would arguably be consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting the TVPA,231 and with
a recent ICJ judgment linking state responsibility to immunity
ratione materiae.232 It would also provide a rationale for U.S. courts
to dismiss cases where the alleged human rights violations are
229
On remand in Samantar, the Executive Branch said the following about the list of
factors it had recited in its Supreme Court brief: “The identiﬁcation of certain considerations that the Executive could or might ﬁnd it appropriate to take into account served
to underscore the range of discretion properly residing in the Executive under the Constitution to make immunity determinations in particular cases. It did not reﬂect a judgment
by the Executive that the considerations mentioned were exhaustive or would necessarily
be relevant to any particular immunity determination if, as the United States argued to
the Supreme Court, the responsibility for doing so was vested in the Executive and not
governed by the FSIA.” Statement of Interest, Yousuf v Samantar, at 5 n 2 (cited in note
15).
230
Although the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia did request immunity for
the defendant in Samantar, the Supreme Court noted that the United States does not
currently recognize this government. See Samantar, 130 S Ct at 2283 and n 3.
231
See the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, S Rep No 102-249, 102d Cong, 1st
Sess 8 (1991) (explaining that, to successfully assert immunity from suit under the TVPA,
“a former ofﬁcial would have to prove an agency relationship to a state, which would
require that the state ‘admit some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts’”).
232
Djibouti v France, 2008 ICJ at 244, ¶ 196 (“[T]he State notifying a foreign court that
judicial process should not proceed, for reasons of immunity, against its State organs, is
assuming responsibility for any internationally wrongful act in issue committed by such
organs.”).
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inextricably linked to de jure or de facto government policies—
such as in the suits against high-level Israeli ofﬁcials involved in
authorized military operations—and where, in addition, the foreign state is prepared to ofﬁcially and publicly identify the defendant’s conduct as linked to those policies.
A remaining question is how much deference U.S. courts should
give to a letter that contains such rules and presumptions. The
answer may turn on several factors, such as whether the document
explains the Executive’s views as to the scope of CIL immunity
for foreign ofﬁcials and the extent to which it is consistent with
the policies of Congress as reﬂected in statutes such as the FSIA,
ATS, and TVPA, an issue discussed in the next section.
c. domestic law considerations
In developing the common law of immunity, courts are also
likely to take into account the policies reﬂected in U.S. domestic
law. As Justice Jackson has explained, “[f]ederal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned
by them.”233 As illustrated by the Sabbatino and First National City
Bank decisions discussed in Section A, this is true even of federal
common law that relates to CIL.
Foreign ofﬁcial immunity does not directly implicate the Constitution, although the role of the judiciary in developing this body
of law may be affected by the separation of powers considerations
discussed above in Sections A and B. More immediately relevant
are four federal statutes: the FSIA, the ATS, the TVPA, and 42
USC § 1983. We discuss below how the policies of each statute
intersect with the common law of foreign ofﬁcial immunity.
Although the Court in Samantar held the FSIA generally inapplicable to suits against foreign ofﬁcials,234 this does not mean
that the statute is irrelevant to the development of common law
immunity. In First National City Bank, the Court concluded that
the FSIA did not address when it is appropriate to pierce the veil
233
D’Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v FDIC, 315 US 447, 472 ( Jackson concurring) (footnote
omitted). See also, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1 (1985) (discussing the circumstances under which federal common law is legitimate).
234
For discussion of how the FSIA may continue to apply in some cases involving suits
against foreign ofﬁcials, see generally Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Ofﬁcial Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 Va J Intl L 1 (2011).
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of a state-owned corporation, but it nevertheless relied in part on
the statute’s policies in fashioning a common law rule.235 Moreover, in an important domestic federal common law decision, Boyle
v United Technologies Corp.,236 the Court concluded that, although
the Federal Tort Claims Act did not address the immunity of U.S.
government contractors, its policies were relevant to the development of a federal common law of government contractor immunity.237
The FSIA is likely to cast a shadow in a variety of contexts. For
example, the FSIA generally limits tort suits against foreign states
and their instrumentalities to situations in which the damage or
injury occurs in the United States.238 In developing the common
law of foreign ofﬁcial immunity, courts may seek to avoid a regime
that allows for circumvention of this limitation by simply naming
responsible foreign ofﬁcials rather than the state itself. The Court
in Samantar did not think this concern compelled application of
the FSIA to suits against foreign ofﬁcials, but this was in part
because, as the Court noted, “[e]ven if a suit is not governed by
the [FSIA], it may still be barred by foreign sovereign immunity
under the common law.”239 The Court also noted that “some actions against an ofﬁcial in his ofﬁcial capacity should be treated
as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real
party in interest,” distinguishing those actions from suits against
an ofﬁcial “in his personal capacity and [that] seek[s] damages from
his own pockets.”240
A related issue concerns the governmental character of abusive
police conduct, including torture. When interpreting the FSIA,
the Supreme Court has explained that “however monstrous such
abuse undoubtedly may be,” it is a “peculiarly sovereign” activity
shielded by immunity.241 Similarly, a number of circuit courts have
235

See First National City Bank, 462 US at 627–28.

236

487 US 500 (1988).

237

See id at 511–12.

238

See 28 USC § 1605(a)(5). Suits against state sponsors of terrorism are a narrow
exception. See 28 USC § 1605A.
239

130 S Ct at 2292.

240

Id.

241

See Saudi Arabia v Nelson, 507 US 349, 361 (1993) (“[T]he intentional conduct alleged
here [the wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture of Nelson] . . . boils down to abuse
of the power of its police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such abuse
undoubtedly may be, a foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has long been
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held that even jus cogens violations by a state fall within the immunity provided for in the FSIA and have rejected arguments that
a state constructively waives its immunity when it engages in such
conduct.242 These conclusions are in tension with the holdings of
several lower federal courts, which, prior to Samantar, held that
torture and other jus cogens violations are not ofﬁcial acts and that,
as a result, the individuals who commit them were not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA or to dismissal under the act of state
doctrine.243
As for the ATS, the Supreme Court discussed its policies at
length in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain.244 The Court unanimously concluded that the ATS was by its terms “only jurisdictional.”245 That
holding suggests that the ATS should not be construed as affecting
issues of immunity—issues that the Court has in other contexts
distinguished from issues of jurisdiction.246 The Court in Sosa proceeded, however, to construe the ATS as also “underwrit[ing] litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the
law of nations.”247 That conclusion would not necessarily affect
immunity, since even statutory causes of action—such as the domestic civil rights statute, 42 USC § 1983—have been construed
as not overriding common law immunities.248
Of greater potential relevance are the reasons for “judicial caution” recited by the Court in Sosa for deciding whether to allow
claims under the ATS. Included among these is the Court’s “general practice . . . to look for legislative guidance before exercising
understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”); see
also Abiola v Abubakar, 267 F Supp 2d 907, 916 (ND Ill 2003) (recognizing common law
immunity of former head of state of Nigeria for jus cogens violations, including torture,
and quoting Saudi Arabia v Nelson, 507 US at 361), aff ’d on other grounds, Enahoro v
Abubakar, 408 F3d 877 (7th Cir 2005).
242
See Sampson v Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F3d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir 2001); Smith
v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F3d 239, 242–45 (2d Cir 1996); Princz v
Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F3d 1166, 1174 (DC Cir 1994); Siderman de Blake v Republic
of Argentina, 965 F2d 699, 714 –19 (9th Cir 1992).
243
See citations in note 59.
244

542 US 692 (2004).

245

Id at 729.

246

See, for example, Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 US 480, 496–97 (1983).

247

Sosa, 542 US at 721.

248
See, for example, Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action,
72 Chi Kent L Rev 695, 698 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court has “presumed that
Congress intended to incorporate well-established common law rules that were in operation at the time the statutes were passed into the causes of action created by the statutes”).
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innovative authority over substantive law,” as well as the “risks of
adverse foreign policy consequences.”249 These factors could be
read to suggest that the judiciary should not take the lead in expanding the civil liability of foreign ofﬁcials beyond what is generally accepted under CIL. On the other hand, although the Court
in Sosa was not focused on the issue of foreign ofﬁcial immunity,
it seemed to endorse Filartiga and other lower court decisions that
had allowed ATS suits against former government ofﬁcials for
alleged jus cogens violations.250
The third statute—the TVPA—likely provides the strongest domestic law argument for limiting immunity in at least some human
rights cases. The TVPA provides a cause of action for damages
for acts of torture or “extrajudicial killing” done “under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”251 By
its terms, the statute focuses on what are typically the actions of
foreign government ofﬁcials. If such ofﬁcials were entitled to immunity for jus cogens violations, including acts of torture or extrajudicial killings, the statute might be rendered largely a nullity.
To be sure, the TVPA would still apply when a foreign government waived the ofﬁcial’s immunity. In addition, if the Executive Branch has the ability to make binding suggestions of nonimmunity (an issue discussed above in Section B), the statute would
still be effective in that circumstance.252 Nothing in the TVPA’s
text or legislative history, however, indicates that it was intended
to be limited to these situations. As a result, it is possible to construe the TVPA as a “controlling legislative act” that would override the CIL of immunity that might otherwise apply to these
claims, although the Charming Betsy canon of construction might
require that Congress’s intent to override CIL be manifest.253 Presumably this construction would apply only to conduct rather than
status immunity.
The legislative history is unclear about the TVPA’s relationship
to foreign ofﬁcial immunity. It suggests that the statute was not
designed to override either diplomatic immunity or head-of-state
immunity—which are both forms of status immunity—but it does
249

Sosa, 542 US at 726, 728.

250

See id at 725, 730.

251

28 USC § 1350 note.
See Matar v Dichter, 563 F3d 9, 15 (2d Cir 2009) (making this point).

252
253

For discussion of this canon, see text accompanying notes 88–90.
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not mention conduct immunity.254 Complicating matters further,
the TVPA was enacted after the Chuidian decision, and Congress
appears to have assumed that suits against foreign ofﬁcials (other
than heads of state) would fall under the FSIA. In this respect,
the House Report states that the TVPA is “subject to the restrictions” of the FSIA, but it also expresses the view that “sovereign
immunity would not generally be an available defense.”255 The
Senate Report elaborates as follows:
To avoid liability by invoking the FSIA, a former ofﬁcial would have
to prove an agency relationship to a state, which would require that
the state “admit some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts.” 28
USC § 1603(b). Because all states are ofﬁcially opposed to torture and
extrajudicial killing, however, the FSIA should normally provide no
defense to an action taken under the TVPA against a former ofﬁcial.256

It is difﬁcult to know how to interpret this passage, both because
relying on legislative history to establish propositions not addressed in the text of a statute is hazardous, but also because the
legislative history appears to be premised on an assumption—the
suits against foreign ofﬁcials are covered by the FSIA—that the
Supreme Court has now rejected.257 In any event, whatever the
implications of the TVPA for foreign ofﬁcial immunity, by its
terms it only covers claims for torture or extrajudicial killing and
does not apply to other human rights violations.258
In addition to these three statutes, human rights advocates are
likely to urge courts to look to domestic civil rights litigation as
a model for the proper scope of ofﬁcial immunity. In this litigation,
such as in suits brought under 42 USC § 1983, government ofﬁcials can often be sued for violating federal rights, especially
constitutional rights, even if the government itself would have
254
See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, HR Rep No 102-367(I), 102d Cong, 1st
Sess 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 USCCAN 84, 87–88.
255

Id.

256

S Rep No 102-249 at 8 (cited in note 231).
Consider also Belhas v Ya’alon, 515 F3d 1279, 1293 (DC Cir 2008) (Williams concurring) (ﬁnding “the overall message of the legislative history [of the TVPA] to be mixed—
and thus ultimately not that helpful”).
257

258
See Sosa, 542 US at 728 (explaining that the “afﬁrmative authority [in the TVPA]
is conﬁned to speciﬁc subject matter, and although the legislative history includes the
remark that [the ATS] should ‘remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law,’ . . .
Congress as a body has done nothing to promote such suits”).
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sovereign immunity from the suit. This is true even though most
constitutional violations require state action.
In the famous Ex parte Young 259 decision, for example, the Supreme
Court permitted a suit for injunctive relief against a state attorney
general for violating the Fourteenth Amendment in enforcing allegedly conﬁscatory railroad rates on behalf of the state, even though
the state itself was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
Court reasoned that, when an ofﬁcial acts contrary to the “superior
authority” of the federal Constitution, the ofﬁcial is “stripped of his
ofﬁcial or representative character and is subjected in his person to
the consequences of his individual conduct.”260 Some federal courts
scholars have described this reasoning as a “ﬁction,” since it envisions
that an ofﬁcial can simultaneously engage in state action for purposes
of constitutional liability but act in a personal capacity for purposes
of immunity,261 and the Supreme Court has itself described the doctrine this way.262 Whether ﬁctional or not, the Court has defended
the Ex parte Young idea as “necessary to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state ofﬁcials responsible to ‘the
supreme authority of the United States.’”263
Ex parte Young applies only to suits for prospective relief. The
rules for suits seeking monetary damages are more complex, although mainly in form rather than in substance. The Supreme
Court has held that sovereign immunity applies in damages suits
brought against state ofﬁcers in their “ofﬁcial” capacity, but not
when the suit is brought against the ofﬁcers in their “personal”
capacity. However, in distinguishing between ofﬁcial and personal
capacity suits, the Court has, at least for tort suits, allowed plaintiffs
to decide how the case should be characterized: if the plaintiff pleads
against an ofﬁcial in their personal capacity, the court will accept
that characterization, but the plaintiff will be allowed to seek damages only from the ofﬁcial, not the state.264 Thus, the bottom line
in many damages suits, just as with claims for injunctive relief, is
259

209 US 123 (1908).

260

Id at 159–60.

261
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that plaintiffs can avoid sovereign immunity by suing state ofﬁcials
rather than the state itself. With some minor complications, a similar regime applies to suits against federal ofﬁcials for constitutional
violations.
Some scholars have urged courts to adopt a similar approach to
foreign ofﬁcial immunity after Samantar.265 This approach would
be consistent with the pre-Samantar lower court decisions that concluded that jus cogens violations cannot be ofﬁcial acts.266 Suits under
the ATS are all tort suits, so the argument would be that, as long
as the plaintiff is seeking damages only from the foreign ofﬁcials
personally, the suits should be deemed to be brought against the
defendants in their personal capacity. This is true even though the
ofﬁcial was a state actor when violating the international law norm
in question. In this way, the proponents of this approach would
contend, U.S. courts can vindicate the supremacy of international
human rights law in the same way that they vindicate the supremacy
of the Constitution under cases such as Ex parte Young.
As one of us has argued, however, there are a number of complications associated with applying the domestic civil rights regime
to suits brought against foreign ofﬁcials.267 First, the domestic regime is premised on the idea that the federal courts have the role
of ensuring that federal and state actors comply with the supreme
federal Constitution. It is not clear, however, that the federal courts
do or should have a comparable role of ensuring that foreign ofﬁcials
comply with international human rights law. As the Court noted
in Sosa:
It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on
our own State and Federal Governments’ power, but quite another to
consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the
power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that
a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits.268
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national law increasingly provides national courts with just this sort
of authority with respect to jus cogens violations.269
Second, in the domestic immunity context, the Supreme Court
has based its approach on a balancing of competing policy considerations. But it is not clear that courts can or should engage in
comparable balancing in the international context. For example, the
Supreme Court in the domestic context has developed a “qualiﬁed
immunity” doctrine that shields domestic ofﬁcials from damages
claims unless it is shown that they violated “clearly established”
federal rights “of which a reasonable person would have
known”270—a doctrine that the Court has described as resulting
from “the balancing of ‘fundamentally antagonistic social policies.’”271 These polices include, on the one hand, the vindication of
federal law, the compensation of victims, and the deterrence of
future misconduct, and, on the other, the promotion of vigorous
public decision making without fear of harassing litigation.272
There has been much scholarly debate in the domestic context
about whether it is proper for the judiciary to attempt to balance
such complicated social trade-offs. Regardless of how that debate
is resolved, U.S. courts may face greater challenges in identifying
and resolving the relevant social trade-offs for other countries, given
that foreign nations have different legal and political cultures, different attitudes toward spreading risk through civil damages, and
different degrees of wealth (and thus different capacities to pay or
indemnify civil damages). At the same time, when U.S. courts apply
jus cogens norms, they can be seen as vindicating fundamental international human rights norms that all nations, including the
United States, have endorsed. Courts could thus reasonably conclude that less policy balancing is required to adjudicate complaints
alleging violations of jus cogens, at least absent additional guidance
from the political branches.
269
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Third, suits against foreign ofﬁcials implicate international law
and foreign relations considerations that do not apply to domestic
ofﬁcer suits. The international law of immunity has nothing to say
about whether a state allows suits against or prosecutions of its own
ofﬁcials, but, as discussed in Part II, it long ago developed rules to
limit the power of one nation’s courts to sit in judgment on the
ofﬁcials of other states. There can be reasonable debates, of course,
about the contours of the CIL of immunity, but there is no question
that it introduces a factor wholly absent from the civil rights context.
In addition, even apart from the speciﬁc question of what international law requires, suits against foreign ofﬁcials present issues
of foreign relations friction and reciprocity that are not posed by
domestic suits.273 Of course, if CIL continues to evolve toward
greater accountability, the adjudication by U.S. courts of at least
certain human rights claims against foreign ofﬁcials in at least some
contexts (for example, those encompassed by the hypothetical State
Department letter discussed in Section B above) might become less
contentious. Such adjudication would also enable U.S. courts to
further a basic principle of international human rights law—“the
recognition that the treatment by a state of its own citizens is a
legitimate matter of international concern and thus of import to its
fellow states.”274
Finally, we note that the critiques of the civil rights paradigm
have less force in cases brought under the TVPA. As noted above,
the TVPA might have little effect if foreign ofﬁcials could claim
immunity for acts of torture or extrajudicial killing. Moreover, unlike the ATS, which is written only in jurisdictional terms, the TVPA
creates a cause of action, its language is similar to the language used
in Section 1983, and its legislative history also contains references
to that statute.275
273
For a discussion of potential foreign relations friction posed by ATS litigation, see
John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort
Statute and Other Approaches, 42 Vand J Transnatl L 1, 9 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 Chi J Intl L 457 (2001). For discussion
of concerns expressed by the U.S. government concerning the broad exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by Belgium over U.S. and other ofﬁcials, see Ratner, 97 Am J Intl L at 890–
91, 893 (cited in note 136).
274
Anne-Marie Burley (now Slaughter), The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 Am J Intl L 461, 490 (1989); consider also Filartiga, 630 F2d
at 890 (“Our holding today . . . is a small but important step in the fulﬁllment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”).
275
See HR Rep No 102-367(I) at 5 (cited in note 254); S Rep No 102-249 at 8 (cited
in note 231).

272

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2010

IV. Conclusion
This article has examined the relevance of CIL to the common law of foreign ofﬁcial immunity that U.S. courts will now
develop in the wake of Samantar v Yousuf. The immunity of states
and their representatives from the judicial process of other nations
has been a central concern of international law since its inception.
The last decade, however, has seen an erosion of international immunity protections for government ofﬁcials who are criminally
prosecuted for their alleged involvement in genocide, torture, war
crimes, and other grave human rights abuses. In their place, international and national mechanisms of accountability are expanding.
Thus far, however, there has not been a general trend outside the
United States to extend the erosion of foreign ofﬁcial immunity to
civil suits in domestic courts, even in suits for alleged violations of
jus cogens.
These evolving CIL immunity rules have important implications
for U.S. courts as they develop the common law of foreign ofﬁcial
immunity. Although the decision in Samantar did not analyze CIL,
the Court was aware of the international backdrop of the case, and
it has emphasized international law’s relevance in a variety of related
contexts. As a result, it is likely that CIL will inﬂuence judicial
assessments of common law immunity claims raised in human rights
litigation after Samantar.
The precise inﬂuence of CIL will be affected by three considerations: the proper institutional role of U.S. courts in the area of
foreign affairs, the weight that should be given to the views of the
Executive Branch, and the congressional policies embodied in domestic statutes. In analyzing each variable, we have intentionally
held the other two variables constant to highlight the relevant legal
and policy choices within that variable. We recognize, of course,
that the variables will often overlap. For example, if the State Department favors abrogating the conduct immunity of former ofﬁcials
for jus cogens violations in certain circumstances, courts that would
otherwise interpret CIL to afford immunity to such ofﬁcials will
need to consider how much weight to give to the department’s
views.
This article has not attempted to advocate particular answers to
these interconnected questions. Nor has it purported to address all
of the conceptual and doctrinal debates implicated by Samantar.
We have focused instead on other important issues—such as the
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evolution of CIL immunity rules and their relevance to human
rights litigation—to isolate the key decisional choices that U.S.
courts will face and to clarify points of uncertainty that other scholars may wish to explore in the future.

